In the run-up to the 2024 election, we can see how domestic politics bring changes to U.S. foreign policy. Interest groups in crucial swing states will play an outsize role in U.S. policy formulation, and their influence will extend beyond their actual voting power.

The upcoming presidential election in the United States could significantly impact China-U.S. relations, though it’s uncertain how each candidate will ultimately approach Beijing. Neither major candidate is perceived as being willing to improve the bilateral relationship at this point, so things could very well get worse.

J.D. Vance’s stance on the American struggle in order to achieve the American dream holds parallels to his China policy, and Washington’s China policy more broadly. Americans’ views on China are similarly paradoxical, as they see China as an adversary but do not prioritize it as one.

If Harris, the current vice president of the United States, is elected president in November, her administration will likely not make radical changes to America’s existing China policies, although some nuanced adjustments could occur in areas such as combating anti-Asian racism and fostering economic stability. Those hoping for improvements should remain realistic about the slim odds of that happening.

As the 2024 U.S. presidential election takes an unexpected turn with Kamala Harris stepping in as the Democratic candidate and Donald Trump showing strong poll numbers, there have been a variety of speculations surrounding future U.S. policies toward China. As in past presidential campaigns, adopting a "tough on China" stance tends to be a winning strategy with voters, so we can likely expect increased critiques in the coming months. But no matter which candidate wins in November, China policies are not likely to change very much from the past two administrations.

Can an assassination attempt improve a candidate’s chances of winning an election? Taiwan’s experience suggests that it might. During its 2004 presidential election, polls showed then-President Chen Shui-bian trailing his opponent, Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) candidate Lien Chan. But this changed abruptly the day before the vote, when Chen and Vice President Annette Lu were shot during an election rally.

No matter who ultimately wins the election in November, only minor adjustments to competition with China at the tactical level are likely to occur. The competitive essence will not change. It’s a Cold War-style outcome that may make bilateral cooperation more difficult.

The unpredictable nature of Trump's China policy, influenced by his ideology, foreign policy team, and personal vendettas, makes it difficult to anticipate the direction of U.S.-China relations under a potential second Trump administration.

Although it’s still early, China is referenced heavily in political rhetoric and is a top target of candidates. Washington is suffused with an atmosphere geopolitical contention. Distorted images of China and emerging hawkish policies have undermined goodwill in bilateral relations. China needs to prepare for any outcome in November.

The youth will be crucial for President Joe Biden’s bid for re-election, as it was in 2020. But Biden’s continued support for Israel is cooling their ardor. To make matters worse, support for Biden among Muslim-Americans — a key voting bloc in some swing states — has taken a nosedive.