If the past is any predictor of the future, then whatever capabilities the U.S. develops, other countries will as well. This has reinvigorated the current security dilemma that has long plagued space strategy based on technology defending technology, particularly in the case of the U.S. and China. It is in every country’s interest to pursue ways to enhance communication and clarify expectations of responsible actors in space with as much vigor as they do contingency warfighting plans and the development of new warfighting technologies. That, unfortunately, has not been the case, even though the last two years have seen more progress in diplomatic space efforts through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space than any other time prior.

A salience-based bargain considers the salience each country considers as its core interest. When applied to China-U.S. relations, it could be helpful in making concessions on both sides in order to come to an agreement on dealing with North Korea.

Both the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army have a special interest in the PRC’s relationship with the North. But presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump seem to understand each other on the Korean Peninsula issue, and there may be no better opportunity for the U.S. and Chinese governments to come to an understanding.

The apparent unilateral action in violation of international law by the U.S. sends an alarming signal to the international community. Whether this is just a one-off deal or it signals the Trump administration’s change of policy back to unilateralism, it brings unpredictable consequences to international peace and stability.

China-US military relations have reached another crossroads with Donald Trump as the new US president. Whether the two sides tend to have more competition and friction or more dialogue and cooperation will shape the two countries’ overall relationship in a major way.

China and the US have different positions on the Syria situation, but they share many common interests too, including restoring peace and stability in the region, cracking down on extremists and rebuilding regional order and the balance of power in the Middle East. The countries differ over how to achieve these goals.

Either scenario is possible, depending on what investigators discover about who was really responsible for the gas attack. Whatever the outcome, big-power cooperation against terrorism has been weakened, and IS terrorists likely were the only ones who were actually cheering amid the explosions of Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The question for Western diplomats dealing in global Internet governance must be how to effectively engage China so as to maintain peace, security and stability in cyberspace – goals to which China’s cooperation strategy commits explicitly. Will cold-shouldering China empower those voices in Beijing advocating a more hawkish and isolating approach to global internet norms? Meeting China halfway on some of its desiderata, for instance a more high-profile presence at flagship Chinese events, might not only lead to a broader basis for engagement and trust, but also enable support for those voices within the Chinese system whose objectives overlap more with that of outside countries.

Could the arbitration award of 12 July 2016 have unexpectedly opened a cycle of appeasement between China and South-East Asian countries in the South China Sea? It is difficult to conclusively answer this question, since behind these changes are uncertainties and continuities likely to undermine at any moment the progress made.

Trump’s eagerness to boost the military’s role in his foreign strategy may well mean tougher positions or even adventurous moves in the South China Sea and on the DPRK nuclear issue, which will not only stimulate sensitive regional situations but also increase risks of an arms race or even confrontation with China.