Steven Stashwick
Independent writer and researcher
Jun 13, 2018
The new missiles China has reportedly deployed to three islands in the Spratly chain could target nearly any ship and most aircraft in the southern half of the South China Sea. This radically changes the strategic environment. These missiles mean that China’s bases in the Spratlys are no longer theoretical military threats but real ones.
Apr 12, 2018
China, the United States, and Japan are putting new emphasis on expanding their amphibious military capabilities, to both seize and defend strategic islands if needed. We may be heading towards an amphibious arms race in the Western Pacific.
Sep 11, 2017
It’s important to be clear about what the U.S. and China’s new communication framework isn’t – it isn’t a crisis resolution mechanism, something that nominally already exists. Rather, the framework will set up a dialogue between the two countries’ joint military staffs to complement existing bilateral dialogues. What this dynamic suggests is that it is the United States, as the initiator of these measures, is the country most concerned about “miscalculation” or crisis escalation.
Jul 05, 2017
With little prospect that the Navy will grow at the rates its leaders say are required to stem an eroding advantage over great power competitors like China, the U.S. Pacific Command, which uses the largest share of the forces the U.S. Navy provides, is moving aggressively to build alternative capabilities to establish sea control without relying on additional ships or submarines.
Apr 13, 2017
An influential Washington think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), released a new report, Restoring American Seapower – A Ne
- “Strengthened” Nuclear Arsenals, Disarmament, and Assured Destruction – Understanding the U.S. and C
Feb 14, 2017
In light of this unexpected focus on the role of nuclear weapons and the prospect of continued U.S.-Chinese competition, it’s worth understanding more about the two countries’ nuclear policies and capabilities. Unlike the United States, China does not acknowledge a potential role for tactical nuclear weapons in fighting or winning a limited conflict, and is thought to maintain only a strategic nuclear arsenal exclusively to deter nuclear coercion or threat from another country.
Dec 22, 2016
Given the apparently low intelligence value of the recently seized U.S. UUV, China may have intended the seizure primarily as a provocation or warning. Though the vessels involved held a low-risk of escalation, the legal precedent is more significant: last Thursday’s incident occurred approximately 50 nautical miles northwest of Subic Bay, nowhere near sensitive Chinese military facilities, and in waters that China has not claimed any jurisdiction over.