Europe’s dealings with China vary greatly from the level of the European Union down to each member’s policies, however explicit they may be. Germany’s role as a leader in Europe makes its own approach to China an important indicator of what the rest of the EU may do.

Since the end of World War II, the West’s hegemonic power has been synonymous with the NATO alliance. Decades later, the scope of NATO’s cause has expanded far beyond the “North Atlantic,” and is now locking horns with an ascendant China.

Italy’s Belt and Road engagement, which was led by the previous liberal administration, is coming to an end, but the inroads China has made in Italy means that creating distance can’t be done with the stroke of a pen.

Dialogues in China show America’s orientation toward “on-demand cooperation,” which is most likely to bear fruit in the green sector and with climate change. It may prove to be a starting point for the recovery of the relationship.

Redefining trade and economic relationships to achieve balance and prevent excessive dependence in strategic sectors has emerged as a key protectionist policy and geopolitical tool among major global powers. And while policies like dumping, dual circulation, security and development, or decoupling and de-risking, all share a common objective, each major power must determine its own mechanisms for course correction.

The United States values the UK’s global vision, as well as its compatible political model and its capacity to manipulate global multilateral discourse. The historical bond between the U.S. and Britain runs deep, and it continues in the new era.

For some time now I’ve believed that the best way to improve the troika of China-European Union-United States relations is for Europe to start to exercise its strategic autonomy when its own national interests diverge from its ally, the United States.

James F. Downes, Mathew Wong and Man Hoo So argue that the EU-China relationship has evolved considerably over recent years into a growing global rivalry in 2023. They argue that whilst the EU has become more interventionist towards China in 2023, there exists large divisions within the core EU institutions alongside EU member states towards relations with China.

Europe is altering its China policy to reduce reliance on vital technologies, while seeking a balance between protecting its interests and fostering cooperation. And by shifting the relationship, we have the opportunity to heal divisions, and prioritize shared interests that have been, expressed, ultimately benefiting everyone involved.

The EU’s pursuit of becoming an autonomous and influential global power, while balancing relationships with the U.S. and China, was jolted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The EU aims to collaborate and compete as an equal with both powers, while improving its domestic strength, ensuring reciprocity, and linking trade to geopolitics, foreign policy, and security. And the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, executing the EU strategy in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and establishing a collective defense structure with operational objectives, are three projects that could help achieve these goals.