Dialogues in China show America’s orientation toward “on-demand cooperation,” which is most likely to bear fruit in the green sector and with climate change. It may prove to be a starting point for the recovery of the relationship.

Redefining trade and economic relationships to achieve balance and prevent excessive dependence in strategic sectors has emerged as a key protectionist policy and geopolitical tool among major global powers. And while policies like dumping, dual circulation, security and development, or decoupling and de-risking, all share a common objective, each major power must determine its own mechanisms for course correction.

The United States values the UK’s global vision, as well as its compatible political model and its capacity to manipulate global multilateral discourse. The historical bond between the U.S. and Britain runs deep, and it continues in the new era.

For some time now I’ve believed that the best way to improve the troika of China-European Union-United States relations is for Europe to start to exercise its strategic autonomy when its own national interests diverge from its ally, the United States.

James F. Downes, Mathew Wong and Man Hoo So argue that the EU-China relationship has evolved considerably over recent years into a growing global rivalry in 2023. They argue that whilst the EU has become more interventionist towards China in 2023, there exists large divisions within the core EU institutions alongside EU member states towards relations with China.

Europe is altering its China policy to reduce reliance on vital technologies, while seeking a balance between protecting its interests and fostering cooperation. And by shifting the relationship, we have the opportunity to heal divisions, and prioritize shared interests that have been, expressed, ultimately benefiting everyone involved.

The EU’s pursuit of becoming an autonomous and influential global power, while balancing relationships with the U.S. and China, was jolted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The EU aims to collaborate and compete as an equal with both powers, while improving its domestic strength, ensuring reciprocity, and linking trade to geopolitics, foreign policy, and security. And the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, executing the EU strategy in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and establishing a collective defense structure with operational objectives, are three projects that could help achieve these goals.

Europe faces three imperatives: It needs to seize the opportunity presented by China’s post-pandemic reopening; it needs China as a stabilizer, in light of the unpredictable prospect of peace in Eastern Europe; and it needs to rebalance its relationship with the United States because of dramatic international shifts in recent years.

In his visit to China, the French president Emmanuel Macron presented views at odds with some others in Europe. America’s European allies appear to lack the mutual trust needed to reach key compromises. With Macron’s advocacy in play, unity may be difficult to achieve.

European interests, in France’s view, will be ignored under the U.S. grand strategy to preserve its hegemony, and so Europe should avoid becoming a U.S. pawn. But this idea has yet to find wide sympathy in Europe, which looks to the United States for its security.