The past month and a half has been one of the most fascinating in contemporary French politics.
With incumbent President Emmanuel Macron calling for an early snap election in the aftermath of a lackluster performance at the recent European Parliamentary elections, the two rounds of voting in early July produced results that fundamentally transformed the political landscape – both in the near-term, and on a more structural level.
Whilst the far-right National Rally (RN) dominated the first round of voting, a combination of tactical voting and candidate drop-outs through strategisation yielded a tentative yet clear ‘reversal’ at the second round: the left-wing New Popular Front (NPF) clocked in first with 182 seats, whilst Macron’s centrist Together alliance took 163. Le Pen’s far-right coalition ended up with only 143 seats.
Many had claimed that this was a victory for the ‘anti-far-right’ cordon sanitaire. Yet with fissures forming within the NPF – given the incendiary allegations by the France Unbowed (LFI), close affiliates of the far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon – there are growing concerns over the tenability and viability of the containment efforts against those on the furthest ends of the political spectrum. As of writing – the new Prime Minister and cabinet have yet to be appointed.
More structurally, the past election had seen an unprecedentedly surge in support for the socially conservative, economically reactionary, and isolationist RN in the first round; whilst such uptick in support did not – eventually – convert into seats in the legislature, it is evident that public disillusionment towards the established ‘ancient regime’ will not easily recede, in the absence of substantial reforms or breakthroughs.
French Attitudes on China, beyond Macron
Throughout his term thus far, Macron has made no concealment of his ambitions of positioning France as a ‘strategically autonomous’ power that is capable of maintaining relations with both the United States and China. Advocating a neo-Gaullist ‘third way’ threading the needle between two increasingly antagonistic strategic rivals, the Élysée has sought to reassure its fellow European Union members that France is sincere in its advocating Europe’s comprehensive interests – as a bloc, as a plurality, and as a pole in an increasingly multi-polar world order.
Whilst these ideals and values have oft been rhetorically raised by Macron, the extent to which he has succeeded in carving out an alternate path remains questionable. Indeed, given the significant domestic turmoil and pushback from fellow rivals within French politics, he is unlikely to possess the much-needed stamina and political resolve to push forward foreign policies that would prove over-incendiary or excessively radical in the eyes of French voters. The days when France sought to punch above its weight – in negotiating and liaising with a truculent Russia, in fostering one of the most amicable positions towards China amongst G7 and leading European countries – appear to be over, at least for the next five years.
Yet it also behooves us to understand what the RN and NPF construe to be the ideal China strategy. To the right, de facto RN spiritual leader Marine le Pen has repeatedly pledged that France will rein in aid to Ukraine in its ongoing war against Russia, as well as trotting out well-rehearsed criticisms of the Ukrainian government whilst taking on a distinctly more accommodative posture towards Russia, as compared with many of her center-right and centrist colleagues. These NATO-skeptical attitudes do not, however, translate to openness to China. Indeed, she has previously pledged that as president, she would seek to prevent the “tie-up [that] risks being the largest danger of the 21st century” – a Sino-Russian partnership. As with many in the New Right in the United States, such as talk show host Tucker Carlson and Donald Trump’s running mate JD Vance, the French far-right are inclined to repair the West’s relations with Russia, in order to clear the path for the Western encirclement and containment strategies towards China.
On the other hand, the NPF features a broad church of attitudes on China. On one hand, Mélenchon has repeatedly praised China and Chinese leaders in his public statements – and is known for generally anti-imperialist and US-skeptical views. Yet some of the NPF’s closest and most influential backers, most notably Raphaël Glucksmann, habour substantially more cynical views towards Beijing, and have been highly vocal on issues perceived by the Chinese leadership to be politically sensitive. In short, there is no coherent China policy amongst these largely domestically oriented left-wing parties.
One way or another, these two factional blocs will have significant effects, even if indirectly, on French foreign policy. Despite the fact that external relations remain largely a Presidential prerogative, even at times of cohabitation between President and Prime Minister from different parties, should members of either bloc be appointed to the new cabinet, it is evident they will be granted significant leverage to conduct external relations via their respective portfolios.
The Sino-French relationship requires sincere and comprehensive cooperation.
2024 marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of China-France diplomatic ties. At this critical juncture, there are numerous reasons as to why China ought to take seriously about Paris’ foreign policy – especially in relation to East Asia and the Sino-American rivalry.
Firstly, France is the only European (qua EU) P5 nation in the Security Council, with the de facto mandate of registering and representing European interests within the highest organ of international governance. As Sino-American tensions intensify, it is pivotal that China keeps Europe as non-aligned as possible – despite the evident strength and value convergence underpinning the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Second, France remains one of the more tenable and largest European economies – despite the plethora of structural issues afflicting its industries and production capacities. Third, Sino-French relations have long been cited by Beijing as an exemplar for the role and power played by cultural and educational ties in China’s engagement with the world. Fundamentally, if Beijing is serious about multi-polarity, it must recognise that France has a constructive and positive role to play in its vision.
China can and should do more. There are several clear low hanging fruits that are worthy of consideration. The first pertains to Chinese investments and capital deployments in France. As France looks to re-industrialise and undertake much-needed diversification of its industries into advanced manufacturing sectors, Chinese firms would be most welcome as primary sources of technical know-how, collaborative capital, and joint venture personnel (itself a form of human capital) in enabling France to make this instrumental leap. From electric vehicles to quantum computers, from critical raw mineral processing facilities to oft-overlooked forms of renewable energy, e.g. nuclear and biomass energy, there is much that France and China can benefit from one another in advancing cooperative schemes and ventures. Whilst Beijing may find the high overhead costs of compliance and bureaucracy in France a source of discomfort, it should not overlook the immense improvement in goodwill and perception of China – and the ensuing, downstream advantages – that would come through Chinese SOEs taking a more embracive attitude to French firms and the French market.
The second suggestion concerns the direct tempering and moderation of rhetoric, as well as genuine investment into the rebuilding of China’s frayed image in the country. The past few years of vitriolic, acrimonious exchanges between Chinese diplomats and their counterparts in the region, have not been conducive towards ameliorating bilateral tensions. Growing concerns over the alleged intransigence and demandingness of Beijing have come to characterise the French public’s expressed attitudes towards China’s rise – neither reflective of the substantial potential in Sino-French collaboration, nor conducive towards strengthening the interest and presence of French investors, tourists, and visitors in the mainland.
The third suggestion is as follows: it is crucial that Beijing identifies and articulates clearly areas beyond ‘low hanging fruits’ where Sino-French cooperation is both necessary and useful. For instance, deep sea oceanic or space exploration appears to be areas where political stakes are somewhat lower than, say, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits. Can technologies, innovation, and research and development be pooled from both nations in advancing a shared agenda? One should remain hopeful, and one should also never forget the fact that the most constructive contributions to bilateral relations between countries have often not come from civil servants or politicians, but subject experts seeking to make the world a better place. I can only remain hopeful that this will indeed stay the case.
