The Italian Prime Minister’s visit to China offers key insights into the state of Sino-European relations, the evolution of de-risking strategies, and China’s response to this challenge.
Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Xi Jinping unfolded as Italy withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a move driven more in geopolitical calculation than economic factors. The decision, following extensive debate, drew criticism from Western allies for potentially shifting allegiances. Moreover, despite signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in March 2019, the anticipated major projects from Beijing never materialized, and China remains outside Italy’s top ten investors.
Xi and Meloni have sought to revitalize the MoU by concentrating on specific projects. Although the meeting was officially tied to the anniversary of their Global Strategic Partnership, the shift to a more immediate three-year Action Plan (2024-2027) instead of the original 5+5 renewable framework signals a reconfiguration of their relationship.
This “BRI rebranding,” therefore, not only steers Italy away from its unique G7-BRI status to a simplified economic partnership yet also serves as a strategic adjustment following Italy’s departure. By effectively replacing BRI membership seven months after without formally rejoining suggests a discreet withdrawal arrangement, especially as China has neither criticized nor retaliated against Italy.
Overall, Meloni has adeptly navigated the pressures from both the U.S. and China, skillfully accommodating each side’s interests without causing offense. Indeed, the most stable aspect of Rome’s otherwise fluctuating policies remains its longstanding alignment with Washington. Furthermore, Italy’s participation in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, viewed as an alternative to the BRI, underscores its commitment to reaffirming its status as a strategic U.S. ally.
However, the tangible benefits for Italians from China remain uncertain and may take time to materialize—if they materialize at all. Given Rome’s previous BRI involvement yielding no major investments, skepticism surrounds whether this new arrangement will deliver better results. In essence, China and Italy are sharing the same pasta dish but choosing different ingredients: replacing the long-term noodles of the BRI for a more discreet and shorter spaghetti “action plan.”
This uncertainty is fueled by two factors. First, Meloni has consistently displayed a distinctive and often unpredictable political character. As Italy’s Youth Minister under Berlusconi, she was a vocal critic of China, making bold yet unsupported statements that led to political setbacks. During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, she called for “a strong gesture,” a boycott of the opening ceremony to protest China’s human rights record—a plea largely ignored by athletes. These performances make her, in Beijing’s eyes, someone difficult to trust. On the plus side, since her election in October 2022 on a hardline, populist platform—Fratelli d’Italia, Meloni has softened her “China half-hawk” stance amid rising U.S.-China tensions.
Second, Meloni spent the month leading up to her visit with Xi clashing with NATO, the European Council, the European Commission, and several EU political parties—moves that likely pleased Zhongnanhai. Tensions sparked by von der Leyen’s recent reelection as President of the Commission, which Meloni’s party opposed despite being the most voted in Italy. This was further compounded by Italy’s loss of a significant NATO position to Spain. This rapid succession of conflicts with Italy’s allies intensifies doubts about the stability and viability of Meloni’s new approach to China.
EU States’ Rising Engagement with China
Nevertheless, the visit to Xi reveals wider patterns within the EU that extend beyond Meloni’s trip and should not be viewed solely through that lens. Instead, it reflects a broader trend among various EU states—both wealthy and less affluent—engaging with China. This momentum, driven by the pursuit of economic opportunities, particularly in emerging green industries and high-tech, continues regardless of Meloni’s visit.
Today, EU states seemingly compete for days spent with Communist Party leaders in China. Germany and France each stayed five days, and Italy was determined to match them. While not reaching Macron’s level of numerous agreements, Meloni secured six deals covering industrial collaboration, geographical indications, food security, the environment, and education, including key areas like electric vehicles and renewable energy. Spain is scheduled to follow in a few weeks.
The case of Germany, its long-standing dependency on China as a top trading partner for eight consecutive years, underscores a profound commercial reliance that has escalated from 5% to 20% of foreign trade over the past two decades.
Other wealthier states like France and Spain are aligning with Chinese electric battery and vehicle manufacturers. This approach allows them to sustain their automotive industries by creating local jobs and sourcing components, while China complies with EU rules of origin to sidestep tariffs. Meloni’s bid aims to capture a slice of the Chinese EV market for Italy.
On the other side of the EU economic spectrum, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia are forging closer ties with China. Greece did this in the past, yet related to strategic infrastructures such as the Piraeus Harbour. These economically challenged countries navigate the balance between the benefits of EU membership and China’s economic opportunities to boost their prospects, albeit in a riskier manner.
De-risking Dilemma: What Should Be the Way Forward?
The key takeaway from Italy’s renewed engagement with China is a clear signal that the EU’s de-risking efforts are being undermined by its own member states. De-risking entails mitigating risks, diversifying partnerships, recalibrating trade relationships, and relocating operations to address disproportionate dependencies in key sectors.
While the Commission advocates for such economic security policies to protect strategic sectors from foreign influence, individual states are increasingly pursuing industrial cooperation with China. This approach aims to attract FDI to Europe, maintain jobs in key industries through joint ventures, access Chinese technology, and enhance competition within the single market.
These developments highlight the Commission’s struggle to initiate European de-risking from China. A year and a half after its formal introduction intended to differentiate it from the U.S.-China decoupling policy, its effectiveness remains largely rhetorical. EU states are readapting to market realities without fully considering the trend of prioritizing security over economic interests. This shift, not universally embraced, is causing rebalancing and impacting the EU’s geopolitical and geoeconomic stance. The IMF estimates that such confrontational policies could shrink global GDP by 7%, a loss of $7.4 trillion.
Further complicating matters, decisions ultimately rest with individual capitals as China diversifies its strategic assets and expands its influence. Governments, corporations, cities fostering sister-city relationships, and universities advancing joint programs all challenge the Commission’s stance, revealing deep divisions within the bloc’s strategy toward China.
A key test for de-risking will be Brussels’ final decision on definitive duties for Chinese electric vehicles (EVs). The July non-binding vote showed that it is likely to pass despite some opposition. With the decisive vote in October, Beijing faces intricate voting subtleties in order to find support from major countries like Germany, Spain or Italy, which has indicated its stance after signing EV agreements. Success could sway the Commission from imposing further tariffs on Chinese exports.
Italy’s China Relations Echo Broader EU States Challenges
Returning to “Italy meets China,” only time will tell if Beijing is serving Rome a dish with more sauce than substance, as bilateral issues persist. The trade imbalance still favors China, and it remains uncertain how Italian businesses can invest more effectively in the Mainland, given the existing—and mounting—barriers for all European companies, particularly in the services sector.
In the short term, each party achieved their goals: China secured renewed commitment from a G7 partner amid the EU’s growing assertiveness, continuing its divide-and-conquer strategy since Xi’s rise in 2013. Meanwhile, Rome sought to emulate Berlin, Paris and Madrid, forging connections for future industries, leveraging Beijing’s crucial role in their development. At best, the trip allowed both sides to reinforce their positions before domestic and international audiences.
Marco Polo was invoked during the visit to symbolize the Sino-Italian relationship. However, while historical references bolster diplomatic efforts, the true test of these renewed engagements lie in their outcomes. The true significance of this chapter will be determined by whether it yields meaningful benefits or merely fades as another echo of past glories.
