Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks in Beijing on July 29. It's Meloni's first trip to China since taking office in 2022, and the second face-to-face meeting after the G20 summit convened in Bali in 2022.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni declared that China was an “important interlocutor” in managing global tensions, on her visit to Beijing in late July. The Chinese and Italian read-outs both offered cautiously caveated yet overarchingly positive remarks on the meeting – with President Xi Jinping praising the “long-established friendly” relations China and Italy have shared.
The broadly effusive undertones at the meeting contrasted sharply with the frosty turn the relationship took during Meloni’s electoral campaign and the subsequent year following her election. At the G20 Summit last year in New Delhi, the Italian Prime Minister declared that her country would pull out of China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative by the year’s end. This came as the culmination of a string of criticisms she made of her predecessors’ China policy – which she portrayed to be excessively concessionary and insufficiently oriented towards the interests of Italians.
With that said, the highly savvy Meloni also left room then for reconciliation, by emphasising the fact that Italy remained open to improving relations with Italy’s second-largest trading partner in Asia. Indeed, her recent meeting with Xi and the subsequent raft of trade agreements fully epitomised the core nature of Meloni’s foreign policy – tactically crafted to optimise Italian interests through a combination of combative rhetoric and effective bargaining.
Why the Sino-Italian Relationship Matters – for Both Powers
A rekindled Sino-Italian relationship is firmly in the interest of China and Italy. China’s reputation and strategic presence within the European Union (EU) have experienced considerable setbacks in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has precipitated a substantial souring of attitudes of ordinary European citizens – especially in larger, Western European states – towards the key trading and financial partner to the bloc. Per a 2023 poll commissioned by a U.S.-funded think-tank and conducted by Ipsos across 13 European countries, 34% of respondents noted that their views on China had worsened, with two-thirds of them reporting the Sino-Russian partnership given the Russian invasion as a key factor.
The consequent drive for greater de-risking, coupled with protectionist concerns over Chinese manufacturers outcompeting domestic counterparts in electric vehicles and other renewable industries, have precipitated significant souring of Sino-European relations between businesses, citizens, and, most chiefly, politicians and bureaucrats. With growing public backlash and in-baked elite skepticism, China’s leverage over European leaders has only weakened since the EU first designated China a “systemic rival” in 2019.
In short, China needs every friend it can find in the EU, considering Washington’s active efforts under President Joe Biden to mend the geo-strategic and defence ties that had frayed during his predecessor’s tenure. With highly Sino-skeptic politicians in the fragile yet enduring coalition in Germany, and significant upheaval and uncertainty in conventionally more China-friendly France, it is only logical that China would strategically seek to court Italy, the third largest economy within the EU.
On the other hand, Italy would also benefit from deepening economic, commercial, and other strategic engagements with China. I have long maintained that the foreign policies of large, European states reflect two critical considerations – their domestic politics, and their search for a dominant strategy vis-à-vis other key players within the bloc. On the former, it is apparent that Meloni’s cabinet would benefit from increased Chinese investment into infrastructure, joint ventures, and even selective technological transfers. With near-stagnant growth rates – slowing to 0.9% in 2023 – and long-standing productivity malaise, Italy has long relied upon tourism inflows and manufacturing of global luxury goods as pillars of its economic strategy. China – both in terms of tourists and consumers – has much to offer on both fronts.
On the latter, it is evident Meloni is hedging against an increasingly isolationist and recalcitrant United States under a prospective second Trump administration. Whilst her socially conservative and populist beliefs have ingratiated her with the traditional base of the erstwhile president, this does not obviate the fact that a NATO-skeptical U.S. would unlikely be able to provide the European bloc and traditional American partners with the certainty they crave, especially as China continues to rise as a potent strategic force. Closer engagement with China would allow Rome to maximise bargaining capital vis-à-vis Washington come January, and position Italy in a stronger place to extract concessions from the incoming American administration – whether it be under Kamala Harris or Trump.
How can Sino-Italian relations be bolstered?
There is much that can be done in strengthening Sino-Italian collaboration. The first prong concerns Chinese investment into Italy – and the paradigm shift from Chinese firms outsourcing production and post-production servicing or distribution to Chinese subcontractors operating abroad, to developing joint manufacturing ventures in coordination with on-the-ground partners. Fundamentally, Italy has a dearth of production capabilities in domains other than luxury goods, whilst Chinese retail and luxury brands would benefit from synergistic partnerships with luxury stalwarts in Italy. Win-win transactions can be brokered, so long as greater market access and protection of foreign firms’ rights and interests in China are offered as constructive rewards for substantive partnerships between Chinese and Italian players. Offering incentives is crucial in clearly delineating the vitality and appeal of the Chinese market – especially in the aftermath of the sluggish post-pandemic recovery.
The second revolves around a shift towards a bilateral modus operandi in negotiating (or renegotiating) trade agreements. As evidenced by Meloni’s pulling-out from the Belt and Road Initiative and long-standing Euro-skeptical views (despite her affinity for NATO), the conservative right-wing small and medium businesses backing the Brothers of Italy (FdI) are wary of large multilateral institutions or pacts that ostensibly stifle the flexibility of trade negotiations on the part of their participants. Beijing should seize upon this and prioritise intense conversations on the future of Sino-Italian engagement – looking to deepen trade even whilst headwinds accrue in Europe at large on this very front. Strategically identifying pockets that Italy is less keen to ‘de-risk’ than its counterparts would be most helpful as a constructive path forward.
The third and final prong pertains to a long-standing weakness in Chinese diplomacy in Europe: the winning of hearts and minds. The key to a sustainable partnership that outlasts and outlives individual governments concerns strong, enduring bonds and trust between the peoples of countries. The inspiring stories of Zhejiang-originating migrants (mostly from Wenzhou) making their home in Italy, as key linchpins of the domestic manufacturing economy, speak truly to the prowess and potential of ordinary civilians as a bridging force amidst an increasingly fractious global geopolitical environment.
China must recognise the agency, proclivities, values, and importance of the Italian people, and double down on country-specific narratives that focus on possible room for convergence and alignment between the Chinese and Italian peoples: their shared commitment to and passion for the arts and culture, for instance.
Indeed, arts and cultural exchanges, taking place via Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing – all leading cities in China, would go a long way in addressing misunderstandings and enhancing mutual respect and affection between the two countries’ populations. Going forward, Beijing and Rome must think not just about the big picture, but also the fine-grained aspects of people-to-people interactions. Ultimately, this is how China can partially repair its frayed image and reputation in Europe at large.
