In light of this unexpected focus on the role of nuclear weapons and the prospect of continued U.S.-Chinese competition, it’s worth understanding more about the two countries’ nuclear policies and capabilities. Unlike the United States, China does not acknowledge a potential role for tactical nuclear weapons in fighting or winning a limited conflict, and is thought to maintain only a strategic nuclear arsenal exclusively to deter nuclear coercion or threat from another country.

If a military blockade is implemented to deny China the access to the South China Sea islands it occupies, it means an invasion against Chinese territory, retired Chinese major general Yao Yunzhu argues.

Like the confidence-building measures that have maintained peace and stability along the disputed China-India border, a code of conduct agreement with ASEAN will smooth relations and invite new cooperation — without regard to the Philippines’ improper and unilateral appeal for outside arbitration.

A peace pact will yield numerous dividends for both sides and promote peace and stability in the Western Pacific, which is why politicians in Beijing and Taipei ought to listen to the people.

Cross-Strait relations in 2017 are only a part of the changing Sino-US relationship and reorganization of the global order. It is in the interests of both the US and China, as well as the interests of Taiwan, to maintain the status quo, which must be recognized anew by Taipei and Washington.

Generations of Chinese leaders have said China aims to have the minimum capability required to launch an effective nuclear counterattack. From the long-term perspective, global disarmament has always been China’s goal, and the country should lead the way to keep other major powers faithful to that goal.

What will be President-elect Donald Trump’s policy on the use of offensive cyber weapons? First, he will likely adopt a more aggressive cyber position, with the subsequent risk of an accelerated cyber arms race. Second, he may loosen cyber alliances and abandon the quest for norms of state behavior in cyberspace. Both prospects could potentially make cyberspace more dangerous for the United States.

China’s Cybersecurity Law has elicited rather negative responses from foreign businesses, governments and NGOs. Perhaps ironically, the U.S. thus seems to have fallen victim to what Beijing has long feared would happen to them: ideological infiltration by a geostrategic adversary aimed at upsetting the political system.

Western overconfidence cost President Obama and US allies the chance to shape the resolution of the Syrian crisis. Turkey’s realignment with Russia and Iran on the issue is a game-changer, for no neighboring countries of Syria can replace the role of Turkey for the Western alliance.

The contrast between a collapsing neo-liberalism of the west and the much-welcomed new development model espoused and practiced by China is not to be missed.