The recent U.S. reconnaissance activities in South China Sea raises the question if another collision is looming in the air. After examining the existing international conventions and laws regarding airspace and maritime encounters, the author argues that the key to preventing another collision is for the U.S. to stop close-in reconnaissance operations near China’s waters.

Whereas aircraft carriers have long provided the U.S. naval primacy as floating islands, China is creating its own artificial islands, complete with deep channels, harbors, berthing areas and airfields, all manned by thousands of troops, to counter that primacy. The consequences of a military clash could easily be disastrous and must be avoided. The politics of keeping the overall U.S.-China relationship on track is a particular challenge in the U.S. during a presidential election year, when candidates are posturing to an unexpectedly populist electorate.

The arbitration tribunal has put its own authority in question by redefining the case against China put before it by the Philippines. All nations should be concerned about what would become of China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea if we let UNCLOS serve as the sole exclusionary source of such entitlements.

Differences over freedom of navigation mainly originate from different interpretations of UNCLOS. As China extends the reaches of its maritime power, the operational capability at sea of the PLA Navy may be constrained due to the question of EEZ jurisdiction, which will invite cooperation with the US at appropriate times. The two countries would benefit from developing a common language on freedom of navigation.

The future direction of trend would very much depend on the perceptions and choices of the parties involved. If they choose to cooperate, they may all win. If they choose to confront each other, they may only head for impasse or even conflict and no one can benefit totally.

The obstinate pursuit of US military hegemony in Asia will inevitably harm interests of both the US and Asian countries. The fundamentally flawed strategy could neither enhance the confidence of US allies, nor give any chance of US victory in any accidental conflicts or unfortunate wars in Asia. In any cost-benefit analysis, the effort is a waste of taxpayers’ money with no possible prospect of playing a constructive role in the region.

To advance its rebalancing strategy, the U.S. will continue to meddle in the South China Sea issue, using its political, diplomatic, public opinion and even military tools to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests to build obstacles to China’s development. But it will limit the scale and intensity of such actions to avoid upsetting well-established cooperation between the two countries on critical issues.

The U.S. military is back in the Philippines after a fourteen-year hiatus, sending the message that it will work with its allies to pushback on Beijing’s expanding presence in the disputed SCS, while also reinforcing belief amongst the Chinese and many others that U.S. is only raising military stakes to thwart China’s rise.

While the US struggles to adjust to its changing role in the international order, China should not give up its principles in handling relations, but be more active, practical and effective in expanding cooperation, and continue to facilitate the building of a new type of major-country relationship between the two countries.

The move by the Philippines to take its territorial disputes to an international tribunal constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and stability. China will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration process. No matter what the final ruling will be, China will not recognize or implement it.