The Philippines has brought arbitration proceedings against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to the South China Sea, and the Tribunal has recently given its decision on whether it has jurisdiction over the claims made by the Philippines.

: Franz-Stefan Gady argues that the end goal of Sino-U.S. deliberations will not be an end to state-sponsored hacking or cyber espionage, but to put a framework in place that will not only help prevent disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other parts of the bilateral relationship, but also help both sides to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes strategic stability, i.e., peace, in cyberspace.

China has been consulting and cooperating with ASEAN nations on the South China Sea issue following the “dual track” approach under corresponding regional and bilateral legal frameworks. The US, by maintaining a lonely existence beyond the international maritime legal order, will eventually isolate itself by attempting to isolate China.

No nuclear-weapon states have given up efforts in modernizing their arsenals, although for different reasons. A commitment of no-first-use is defensive in nature, but it doesn’t exclude nuclear retaliation. Such a pledge doesn’t cripple other countries’ nuclear capabilities: It boosts confidence that a world free of nuclear weapons is eventually possible.

Norms, or generally accepted modes of behaviour, have provided a quicker and more flexible approach than international law for governing actions in cyberspace. While both China and the United States have begun discussing such behaviour in terms of international law, it currently seems unlikely that an agreement, or even trust, will be reached in the near future.

Although a rules-based and law-based approach in the international arena is an admirable aspiration, law will not solve the dangerous problems in the South China Sea. More specifically, the upcoming ruling in the case brought by the Philippines against China before an arbitration tribunal under the U.N. Convention the Law of the Seas will not solve the problems or even make a major headway in resolving them. An examination of the issues before the tribunal and its most likely decisions demonstrate that the tribunal and law can make only a very limited contribution to resolving the South China Sea crisis. Law will not save us from continuing to focus predominantly on negotiations and power politics.

To predict, prevent and manage crises, especially those triggered by third-party factors, should become the top priority in China-U.S. strategic consultations, in order to establish higher levels and broader scopes of risk-prevention and control mechanisms.

China regards both the U.S. and Iran as important partners, which is why Beijing played a major role in putting together the Iran nuclear deal. Implementing that plan will face challenges in both the U.S. and Iran, and China’s commitment to building a new type of major-country relationship with the US means it will continue to assist both countries to keep the deal moving forward.

The U.S. decision to remove all restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam does not aim to militarize the South China Sea dispute or contain China. Rather, the decision was but the latest move among the great powers to pursue their interests in Southeast Asia, which for the United States focus on discouraging China or anyone else from using military power to pursue a coercive solution to territorial conflicts.

In a recent editorial, the New York Times accuses China of “playing chicken” in the South China Sea, which as Benjamin Reynolds argues, dramatically inflates the threat that China poses to the region and the United States. The critique is not militarism, threatening behavior, or the revision of international norms as such. Rather, the narrative outlined by the Times is the standard hawkish U.S. narrative about China and the South China Sea, which have preceded invasions in Vietnam, Iraq, and bombing in Libya, too.