On Jan. 23, U.S. President Donald Trump delivered a video address and answered questions at the World Economic Forum 2025 Annual Meeting. Europe likely did not receive the answers it had hoped for. Over the next four years, America’s European policy and the relationships between China, the U.S. and Europe will enter a new and more complex phase.
Trump’s second-term policy toward Europe continues his consistent “America first” stance. Especially in the trade and economic fields, he is likely to implement tougher policies against the European Union. Trump has explicitly stated that he plans to impose a 10 to 20 percent tariff on all imported goods, a move that not only aims to revitalize U.S. manufacturing but could also place significant pressure on the EU economy. Export-oriented economies, particularly Germany’s, may face losses due to high tariffs. Trump has also threatened to impose tariffs of over 60 percent on all goods from China, which would also have a deep impact on the EU economy.
In security, Trump’s policy toward Europe also carries uncertainties. During his first term, Trump repeatedly criticized NATO defense spending and urged allied countries to take on a greater share of the defense burden. At the World Economic Forum 2025, Trump clearly stated that NATO members should increase their defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, which would undoubtedly place greater fiscal pressure on European nations.
Moreover, Trump’s stance on Ukraine has raised concerns in Europe. He has suggested pressuring Ukraine to make concessions on territory, for example. While he has pledged that the U.S. will continue to support Ukraine, his specific policy remains unclear, which may leave European countries uneasy, as they fear that a shift in U.S. support for Ukraine could undermine European security.
In the realm of global governance, Trump’s climate policy is likely to continue to clash with the European Union. He has already announced his withdrawal from the Paris agreement and committed to increasing U.S. oil and gas production. For Trump, the inevitable contradiction between climate policy and economic interest means that promoting fossil fuel production and use will be central to the U.S. economic recovery.
From a political and diplomatic perspective, the way the U.S. interacts with Europe could undergo a fundamental shift. Trump has had a good relationship with leaders of some European countries, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and on certain diplomatic and security issues he shares common ground with these leaders. Yet Trump prefers to engage in one-on-one dialogue with individual EU member states, bypassing the group’s governing bodies to advance bilateral relations. This approach could lead to further divisions within the EU and weaken its influence in global affairs.
Since Trump’s re-election, European countries have shown a clear divide in their reactions. Traditional allies such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom have expressed trepidation about Trump’s return, particularly in the areas of defense and economics, fearing that his policies could weaken transatlantic unity. On the other hand, countries such as Hungary and Italy are more inclined to support Trump’s policies, as they hope for greater bilateral cooperation.
Most European countries believe that Trump is likely to intensify economic and security pressures on the EU, particularly in trade and NATO defense spending. In response to this uncertainty, the EU is increasingly focused on strengthening unity and expanding strategic autonomy as it pushes for more military spending and seeks a more independent foreign policy that is less reliant on the United States.
Against this backdrop, transatlantic coordination on China policy faces significant challenges. While the U.S. and the EU share common concerns on certain issues — including technology security, trade imbalances and China’s market access — there remain substantial differences in their positions and policy tools.
The Trump administration may adopt a more unilateral and direct approach to China, using trade tariffs, export controls and restrictions on Chinese companies’ access to international markets as a means of exerting pressure to slow China’s economic and technological development. The Trump administration is also likely to continue ramping up its crackdown on Chinese tech companies by restricting their entry into the U.S. market and enhancing constraints on China’s position in global technology supply chains. This will intensify the competition between the U.S. and China in cutting-edge technology, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence and big data. It may even lead to the formation of a technological “iron curtain.”
The EU’s stance in this area remains relatively moderate. While the EU has gradually recognized China’s growing influence in the global economy and technology sectors, and has adopted a more cautious approach in some areas — for instance, 5G technology and investment screening — the EU prefers overall to resolve disputes with China through multilateral mechanisms and diplomatic dialogue, rather than resorting to the confrontational policies of the Trump administration.
This difference in approach could lead to a divergence in policies toward China by the U.S. and EU. The Trump administration will likely continue to push for joint U.S.-EU actions on China, particularly in areas such as technology security, trade imbalances and national security. In this context, the EU may, to some extent, or in certain areas, abandon its traditional stance of trade liberalism and support the U.S. in applying pressure on China over key issues. For example, while the EU has consistently emphasized its autonomy in its technology choices, under U.S. pressure some EU member states may adopt a more cautious approach to Chinese tech investments and cooperation.c
EU decision-making will also be constrained by internal divisions. Major countries such as France and Germany are likely to continue advancing economic cooperation with China, particularly in areas such as the green transition, climate change and energy.
As the world’s second-largest economy and a key market, China remains attractive to Europe. Therefore, even though the U.S. and EU may align more closely on the general direction of their China policies, the EU will maintain its independence and commitment to multilateralism in specific cases, particularly in critical areas such as high-tech industries and global governance.
The initial phase of Trump 2.0’s China policy is relatively stable, with expected tariffs yet to be implemented. But future developments remain highly uncertain. Any adjustments in U.S. policy toward China could exacerbate transatlantic differences. In the face of the potential for a U.S.-EU alliance to apply joint pressure, China will need to adopt a more flexible diplomatic strategy, push for greater innovation and strengthen the resilience and security of its industrial and supply chains. Simultaneously, it must bolster cooperation with economies around the world and promote higher-level openness.
China should continue to deepen its cooperation with Europe, especially in areas such as global climate governance, green development and infrastructure construction. These areas not only represent traditional strengths in China-EU cooperation but are also important sectors in which both sides share a common global interest.
