The second Trump administration’s China policies have thus far been very opaque and difficult to discern. However, in recent weeks a variety of indicators are beginning to make them clearer—and one dominant theme emerges: China will be viewed as America’s principal adversary.
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U.S. President Trump has raised the tariff for Chinese imports to the U.S. to 125 per cent, while granting other countries a 90-day pause. (Photo: Artwork by William Pearce/The Nightly)
As the world reels from—and tries to absorb—the blizzard of provocative initiatives in the foreign policies of Donald Trump’s second administration, one key element has been missing: China policy. The Trump administration has unveiled its policies—many shocking—towards other parts of the world before turning its attention to China.
It has undermined the transatlantic alliance and stunned Europeans by distancing America from its bedrock allies in NATO and the EU, while pulling back on support for Ukraine’s defensive war for survival against Vladimir Putin’s brazen invasion. Perhaps more astounding has been Trump’s personal outreach to Putin and his stated desire to reset America’s relationship with Russia from adversary to partner. In the Middle East, Trump has stood steadfast with Israel while ignoring the regional and worldwide condemnation of its military actions in Gaza, instead offering a real estate development deal to turn destroyed Gaza into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” It has reprioritized U.S. relations with Latin America’s long-neglected hemispheric neighbors. President Trump has also signaled continuity of positive and productive relations with India, hosting President Modi at the White House early in his term. And, most bizarrely, Trump has threatened to annex Canada, Denmark’s Greenland, and possibly the Panama Canal. All of these abrupt foreign policy departures have left the world—indeed many Americans as well—in shock.
But when it comes to Asia, the Indo-Pacific and China, the second Trump administration has been remarkably quiet during its first three months in office. But over the past couple of weeks the broad outlines of the administration’s China and regional policies have become somewhat clearer. To be sure, no formal policy documents (such as the required National Security Strategy of the United States) have been issued, and President Trump himself has not made any programmatic and philosophical pronouncements about how he views China and what kind of systemic policies he plans to pursue.
Everything Trump has said publicly has been episodic. More than once he has referred to Chinese leader Xi Jinping as his “good friend” with whom he enjoys a “great relationship” and has several times hinted that Xi may visit the United States “in the not-too-distant future.” Such statements, taken together with Trump’s outreach to Putin and Russia, have led to considerable speculation that Trump seeks a big-package “deal” with Beijing—potentially overturning the competitive and confrontational policies of his first administration as well as the Biden administration in favor of a reset and more cooperative relationship with China.
Of course, Trump has criticized China’s yawning trade surplus in goods—and he has slapped 54% tariffs on China (20% initially and then 34% recently). The Chinese government has precisely reciprocated in kind. But, beyond the trade issue (Trump’s obsession), he has said nothing concerning China more broadly—nothing about its military expansion, nothing about its threatening coercive actions vis-à-vis Taiwan, nothing about its expansionist activities in the East and South China Seas, nothing about its global Belt & Road program, nothing about its bullying of American ally the Philippines, nothing about its tight relationship with Russia and de facto support for Putin’s war against Ukraine, nothing about its domestic human rights record or economic situation. Nothing on these topics that populate the global news cycle.
Trump has been uncharacteristically silent on China. He has, of course, criticized China’s export of chemical precursors used in the manufacture of fentanyl in Mexico. He has also chastised Taiwan for its low level of defense spending and has likened Taiwan’s relationship with the United States to an “insurance policy” which Taipei needs to pay much more for to insure its security. He has also called for increased Chinese investment into the United States, although he issued a Presidential Memorandum (different than an Executive Order) that established broad guidelines to stop American companies and investors from working with Chinese entities linked to its military-industrial complex and “civil-military fusion” program. The same directive also issued an injunction against Chinese entities “from buying up critical American businesses and assets.”
While President Trump himself has said little, recently senior members of his administration have begun to stake out more hawkish positions and it is becoming clearer that China is becoming the principal adversary of the second Trump administration.
On April 3, after meeting with European foreign ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on X (formerly Twitter) that he had informed his European colleagues: “It’s not complicated: China threatens our security and prosperity.” Of course, as a Senator, Rubio has a long and well-established track record as one of the most knowledgeable members about China in Congress, and also one of the most critical. In his Senate confirmation hearings, Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
“We welcomed the Chinese Communist Party into the global order, and they took advantage of all of its benefits, and they ignored all of its obligations and responsibilities. Instead, they have repressed and lied and cheated and hacked and stolen their way into global superpower status.”
Rubio’s counterpart Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has also begun to clarify the administration’s China posture. Hegseth recently toured the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu and visited U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines. During his tour he made three things very clear: that the Indo-Pacific would become the priority region of the Department of Defense, that China was its principal “pacing challenge” and that China posed multidimensional threats to the region, and that deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a high priority. While in Manilla, at a news conference, Hegseth publicly told his Philippines’ counterpart Gilberto Teodoro: “We are facing a common threat, which is the overreach of the Communist Party of China… Today, it’s the Philippines. Tomorrow, it’s Japan. It will [then] be Australia and South Korea and other nations in this part of the world.” As a result, Hegseth said, the Trump administration would “truly prioritize and shift to this region of the world in a way that is unprecedented.” After the Philippines, Hegseth went on to Japan where he similarly stated: “America and Japan stand firmly together in the face of aggressive and coercive actions by the Communist Chinese.”
During Hegseth’s tour of the Pacific, coincidentally or not, an important nine-page U.S. Department of Defense document, marked “Secret” and known as “Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance,” was leaked to the Washington Post. According to the document, the Department of Defense will “prioritize deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan and shoring up homeland defense,” and it further stated that “China is the Department’s sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fair accompli seizure of Taiwan—while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland is the Department’s sole pacing scenario.” The document, according to the Washington Post, called for a “denial defense” of Taiwan which included a variety of active measures to increase the U.S. military presence in the region.
Other data points that also point to the second Trump administration making China its primary adversary include the State Department sanctioning of six more Hong Kong officials for human rights violations. In so doing, Secretary of State Rubio stated: “The sanctions demonstrate the Trump administration’s commitment to hold to account those responsible for depriving people in Hong Kong of protected rights and freedoms or who commit acts of transnational repression on U.S. soil or against U.S. persons.” On March 25, the Trump administration also added 80 Chinese companies and organizations to its existing “Entity List” of those barred from acquiring American technologies owing to national security concerns. The Trump Justice Department also issued indictments in March charging eight Chinese employees of the technology company i-Soon and two officers of China’s Ministry of Public Security on a variety of cyber hacking related offenses.
Taken together, these recent actions taken by the Trump administration begin to shed some light and clarity on how it views China and what its China policies will be. However, the largest undetermined variable is President Trump himself. A possible struggle may emerge between the President and his own administration, and Congressional Republicans will be caught in the middle. Thus far, the Republican Congress has stayed in lockstep with President Trump, but they could part ways over China policy.
