Trump’s second term could pave the way for extended rule by undermining institutions and consolidating power, following the pattern of historical self-coups. This would not only threaten U.S. democracy but also disrupt global stability, forcing nations like China to rethink their long-term strategies.
“This may not be a four-year presidency. There’s a good chance it’s a 12-year presidency.”
Dennis Wilder, a former senior U.S. intelligence official, delivered these stark words during a March 2025 debate at the London School of Economics. A CIA veteran and White House adviser with decades of experience analyzing power transitions, he underscored what many observers had feared but few had stated outright: Donald Trump’s second term as a prelude to constitutional rupture—a self-coup unfolding in plain sight.
Unlike a traditional coup d’état characterized by military displays and institutional collapse, self-coups dismantle democracy from within, wrapped in legal rhetoric and national security justifications. The assault on democracy wears the guise of its defense.
Trump has already flirted with this script. His refusal to concede in 2020, the demand for officials to “find” votes, and the January 6, 2021 Capitol attack exposed both intent and method. The system withstood this initial assault—institutional guardrails bent but did not break. Now he is back, emboldened by experience and deeper institutional knowledge.
His aspirations for extended rule echo in his own declarations. In 2018, he praised Xi Jinping for becoming “president for life,” adding, “Maybe we’ll have to give that a shot someday.” Addressing Republican lawmakers last November: “I suspect I won’t be running again... Unless you say, ‘He’s so good we’ve got to figure something else out.’” In Las Vegas this January: “It will be the greatest honor of my life to serve, not once but twice—or three times or four times.”
The White House itself amplified this message on February 19 with a social media post on X depicting Trump crowned in gold, captioned: “LONG LIVE THE KING!”
Historical Parallels
Trump’s second term establishes a darker institutional stage. With loyalists positioned throughout government and first-term lessons absorbed, his power extension strategy shifts from amateur improvisation to professional execution. Dismissing this as alarmism repeats the fatal miscalculations of 2016 and 2020—underestimating both his intent and capacity.
History demonstrates how elected leaders consolidate power before dismantling democratic checks. Successful self-coups require meticulous groundwork. In 1992, Peru’s Fujimori dissolved Congress, casting lawmakers as enemies of progress—an echo of Trump’s “drain the swamp in Washington, D.C.” rhetoric. Turkey’s Erdoğan undermined judicial independence through constitutional revisions, resembling Trump’s court-packing ambitions.
The military remains the decisive factor in any constitutional subversion attempt. Trump’s attacks on “woke generals” and promises to restructure military leadership reveal his understanding of this decisive element—success would require methodically purging opposition throughout government, especially reshaping the chain of command to prioritize personal loyalty over constitutional oaths.
Recent cases underscores this point—Castillo’s 2022 effort in Peru collapsed when generals refused illegal orders, while Erdoğan’s survival in Turkey depended on preemptively purging military leadership after the 2016 coup attempt. These examples illustrate how leaders seeking to entrench power must first neutralize institutional resistance.
Trump’s approach would follow a similar pattern. His toolkit for extending power could include invoking the Insurrection Act against domestic opponents, neutralizing career bureaucrats, intelligence agencies, and disloyal Republicans; using emergency powers based on manufactured crises; and weaponizing the Justice Department.
Broader empirical evidence highlights the cost of democratic erosion. The Colpus dataset, compiled by political scientist John J. Chin, documents 46 self-coups by elected leaders since 1945—80% accomplished their goal, a sobering statistic. The reason for this high success rate lies in what former Foreign Policy editor-in-chief Moisés Naím identifies as the deadly trio of populism, polarization, and post-truth—the “P+P+P” formula—creating ideal conditions for democratic collapse. Trump’s America exhibits all three markers in full force.
In this context, Yale historian Timothy Snyder’s warning in On Tyranny becomes all the more pertinent: “anticipatory obedience” is a political tragedy. People, caught in the tide of emerging power, often surrender without reflection, unknowingly setting the stage for a decline that may be impossible to reverse.
Financial elites often play that role, welcoming the stability strongmen promise. Columbia Historian Adam Tooze explores this interplay between economic performance and political authoritarianism, where markets initially celebrate autocrats’ rise, prioritizing short-term economic certainty over long-term democratic health. Wall Street’s muted response to Trump’s illiberal impulses follows this pattern, reinforcing the conditions for democracy’s quiet suffocation.
The China Dimension
Beyond domestic implications, Wilder’s comment holds strategic significance for global politics. Delivered at the LSE’s China Development Forum—a prestigious gathering of China experts—it followed a heated exchange with Malaysian economist Danny Quah.
Rather than traditional diplomatic channels, the message targeted elite policy intellectuals, signaling to a broader audience. Framing the “12-year presidency” concept in this setting ensured a swift circulation through Chinese policy networks.
China may have anticipated a return to predictable U.S. leadership post-Trump, but this statement upends that expectation. A presidency defying term limits summons Beijing to reassess its Taiwan strategy, Belt and Road investments, and military posture across the Asia-Pacific. A Trump dynasty would disrupt assumptions of stable U.S. policy cycles every 4-8 years and could accelerate regional moves while Washington turns inward.
Thus far, his second term has fueled anxiety in Beijing, particularly regarding Trump’s volatility, economic stability, and bilateral relations. His tariff hikes—including up to 60% on Chinese goods—and erratic foreign policy raise alarms about trade, technology, and geopolitical strategies.
These concerns are heightened by his use of the war in Ukraine to reshape U.S.-Russia relations through an alleged “reverse Nixon” strategy—one that, as Brian Wong notes, is unlikely to succeed given Moscow’s deep economic and financial ties to Beijing.
Financial implications further complicate the picture. U.S. institutional decline could weaken dollar dominance, while prolonged market volatility might destabilize China’s economy. A trade war with no end in sight exacerbates these concerns.
Meanwhile, the technological decoupling already underway would accelerate, pushing China toward self-sufficiency and fragmenting global collaboration in emerging tech. The result: a bifurcated technological setting with competing standards, protocols, and governance models at a time when coordinated approaches are most needed.
Rather than adapting to cyclical policy shifts, Beijing must now consider an extended “Trump Corollary” lasting through 2036—directly overlapping with China’s key development milestones. A prolonged Trump presidency presents a paradox: weakened U.S. institutions yet greater policy continuity through personalized leadership. Beijing may now prepare for an America that is both more erratic and more enduring.
America at the Brink
Claims that “the system worked” during Trump’s first term miss a crucial point: institutions are only as strong as those who uphold them. As Timothy Snyder warns, “Institutions do not protect themselves. They fall one after the other unless each is defended from the beginning.”
This is the gravest constitutional crisis since the Civil War. The two-term limit, long seen as a barrier to indefinite rule—established by Washington’s example and codified after FDR’s four terms—, offers no inherent protection. Trump’s approach may differ from that of foreign autocrats in style, but the goal, prolonged personal rule, follows the same logic.
Democracy is not self-sustaining. Courts must uphold the law, civil society must hold power accountable, and the media must expose power’s abuses. This is not about partisanship but the survival of constitutional governance. The moment to act is now—before the choice is no longer ours to make.
