World order is changing fast. China and the US need to forge a closer relationship that will serve as a solid anchor for a world buffeted by strong winds and hail.

Recently, the leaders of the world descended upon New York City for the opening of the 72nd United Nations General Assembly. However, despite Trump’s debut speech generating great interest and concern amongst the world and it’s leaders, several notable leaders were absent, namely China’s President Xi Jinping.

The end of the Cold War and China’s integration into the world economy generated the context that led to a serious soul searching for China’s “identity” in the international system. While a shifting balance of power, socialization, and crises have driven China’s involvement in global governance, they have not led to similar advancement in U.S.-China cooperation in global governance.

The debate about “world order” and “China’s new leadership role” is attracting more attention especially when China has more loudly expressed support to the economic globalization and free-trade at a time when these ideas are under criticism in the Western world. Many in China who are also interested in the debate find the concepts behind these terms are not as clear as they may look.

The world was shaken up last year by events from populist movements to terrorism to shifting alliances. How major powers react to this volatility – and to each other – will determine if 2017 extends the chaos or shapes a new world order.

The contrast between a collapsing neo-liberalism of the west and the much-welcomed new development model espoused and practiced by China is not to be missed.

China has accepted some gains from the world order established by the United States, but they disapprove of how the structure reflects exclusively American values and is buttressed “by a military alignment, which does not take into consideration the security interests of others.” Some Chinese commentators can also see a great benefit to aligning with Russia to offset the U.S.; however, uncertainty about regional powers and IGO influence remains pivotal to the current great-power structure.

Democracies aim to improve their democratic system while learning from the best of meritocratic practices, and meritocracies aim to improve their meritocratic system while learning from the best of democratic practices. There is no more talk about which system is superior: both political systems recognize each other as morally legitimate even though they are built on different foundations. The United States is the dominant power in the West, China in East Asia, but they strive to cooperate in areas of common concerns.

The US has shown no desire to defend the arbitration award with force as hinted by the exercise in the Philippine Sea. Although the American strategic community now sees markedly greater risks of military conflict with China, US decision-makers also don’t believe that the US has the ability to change or stop China’s international conduct by force.

Trump’s security and diplomatic policies may offer opportunities for China, but that would be secondary compared with the damage he may inflict on China-US economic and financial relations. The China-US economic and financial relationship means a lot to the Chinese economic health at home, especially in the face of the nativism, populism and nationalism that seems to be sweeping the globe.