The Russia-Ukraine war has had a direct impact on China-U.S. relations, with American rhetoric putting China in a difficult position. Going forward, prevention of conflict between the two big powers depends not only on their own actions but also on the entire international community.

As a geopolitical confrontation with global implications in the European region, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has an important and complex impact on China-EU relations.

The dominant narrative on the Chinese side is that this strategic competition between the two countries reflects the struggles for power, institutions, and perceptions, which will last throughout the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In general, it is thus believed that competition and struggle have been adopted as key words for both Washington and Beijing in managing their relations.

Up till now, the fighting has been going on for over 100 days, with the two warring sides still in an offensive and defensive stalemate. Questions about this ongoing crisis can be listed in a long line, most of which no one can answer at this time. Yet among all the uncertainties, one thing is certain: what the Russian troops crossed on February 24 was not simply the land border between Russia and Ukraine, but rather more symbolically, the River Rubicon of the post-cold war international order.

Alienating Russia will not increase stability for Europe, nor will Russia disappear as a result of the Ukraine war. But Russia’s old power model — needlessly using force to punish countries for switching sides — needs to change.

If the United States and China went into armed conflict, it would be ruinous for both nations. The two governments must work together to find common ground, address arising issues, including tensions with Taiwan, and prevent war.

With President Joe Biden’s Asia tour and recent remarks by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the United States has begun putting a Cold War notion into practice once again. But what has failed in the past will not likely succeed in the future.

There was nothing new revealed in the U.S. president’s visit, other than launching Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Roping in Japan and South Korea and declaring that the U.S. would “intervene” in a Taiwan conflict, all amounted to old news.

The U.S. secretary of state restated and reinforced the Biden administration’s approach, proposing an “invest, align, compete” strategy for success over China. The speech revealed significant clues about the features of America’s basic strategic game ahead.

The goal of the United States in creating the IPEF is to gain an asymmetric technological advantage over China and to create an environment for long-term competition. It wants a new rules-based Indo-Pacific order forged in its own image.