Despite the fact that nuclear weapons have been used only once — at the end of World War II — the potential risks associated with their unauthorized, inadvertent or mistaken use remain a significant concern. That warning was conveyed in the 1964 film “Fail Safe,” a thriller based on the novel of the same name by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler. The film depicted a fictional yet thought-provoking scenario in which a critical error sent a group of U.S. bombers to destroy Moscow and brought on a crisis. Despite considerable efforts to revoke the order, these were ultimately futile, underscoring the importance of robust safeguards to prevent nuclear missteps.
Since the Cold War, the United States has developed the concept of “nuclear fail-safe” and conducted fail-safe reviews to identify potential loopholes in its nuclear systems. Other nuclear-weapon states are also taking strict measures for the management of nukes. Yes, it is possible for states with nuclear weapons to take unilateral, bilateral or multilateral steps to reduce the risks.
“Broken arrows”
The risks of nuclear accidents, mistakes or blunders is a tangible reality despite strict safety measures that are already in place. The U.S. Department of Defense identified 32 nuclear weapon accidents — known as “broken arrows” — that have occurred in the half-century between 1950 and 2000. More recently, in 2006, four electrical fuses manufactured for use on a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile were mistakenly shipped to Taiwan instead of the helicopter batteries that had been ordered from the U.S. In another incident, in August 2007, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana for training purpose, with six AGM-129 cruise missiles mistakenly loaded with nuclear warheads instead of inert ones. The bomber had been parked for about nine hours without a special guard before the warheads were discovered.
Such nuclear-related incidents have been reported in Russia, too. In January 1995, Russia narrowly avoided nuclear war over ambiguous data from its early-warning radar systems that mistook a Norwegian scientific rocket for a U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile. The two have similar fight characteristics. Russian nuclear forces quickly went on full alert and Russian President Boris Yeltsin activated his “nuclear football” and retrieved launch codes before it was all declared a false alarm. Similar incidents have occurred multiple times in the Soviet Union (Russia) and the United States.
It is therefore imperative for nuclear-weapon states to ensure that nuclear fail-safe systems are in place and fully adhered to. Nuclear fail-safe means safeguards that are intended to reduce three types of risks. The first type is the risk of unauthorized use, such as terrorism or sabotage. Second is the risk of inadvertent use, which is caused by noncompliant and unprofessional human operations or technical failures (hardware or software). The 2006 and 2007 incidents in the United States fall into this category. Third is the risk of mistaken use of nuclear weapons, which may result from miscalculations arising from technical issues, false alarms, misinformation, disinformation, cognitive bias and other factors. The 1995 Russia incident is an example of this type of risk.
It should be noted that in the context of nuclear fail-safe, the risks of the use of nuclear weapons extend beyond the mere launch. They encompass a range of potential dangers, including the risks of ignition, detonation, theft or loss, as well as accidents, which may occur during transportation, storage, training or other related processes.
In-depth plan needed
To reduce nuclear-related risks, a range of technical, policy and procedural measures should be enacted. For example, the Kirkpatrick Commission, in its final report on nuclear fail-safe and risk reduction after the first U.S. fail-safe review in 1992, noted that the risk of unauthorized or inadvertent launches of nuclear weapons could be potentially reduced by placing coded control devices on U.S. the weapons at sea and by incorporating post-launch destruct devices as an additional safeguard. These would be technical measures.
Policy measures might be able to reduce nuclear-related risks in different ways. To reduce the risk of miscalculation, the key point is to allow the policymakers more time to make decisions. One way to extend time is by altering the nuclear strategy. Rapid nuclear reactions can result in catastrophic failures. In the 1995 Russia incident, for example, a nuclear war was avoided because Russian leaders had sufficient time to verify the warning of a possible nuclear attack before taking any retaliatory action.
Altering a state’s nuclear strategy could also help lower the alert level of its nuclear forces, which in turn would contribute to risk reduction. The so-called two-man policy is another key measure that can mitigate the risks of miscalculation. Both of these are examples of procedural safeguards that enhance nuclear fail-safe.
Because the risk of unauthorized, inadvertent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons can arise from various factors, a comprehensive set of measures is required. The 2007 Minot incident was found by investigators to have been caused by a “breakdown in training, discipline, supervision, and leadership.” It led to firings, revamped training procedures, a new nuclear culture and higher performance standards. It also elevated the nuclear mission back to the top of the U.S. Air Force’s priority list. As a result, the Global Strike Command was established, with its sole focus on nuclear missions and standards.
Based on the limited information available to the public, China’s “No first use” policy, or NFU, plays a crucial role in minimizing the chances of a nuclear blunder. While some Western scholars and governments speculate that China may have shifted from its NFU policy to a “launch-on-warning” posture, such claims remain unsubstantiated due to a lack of evidence. Officially, China is committed to its unconditional NFU policy. It has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear state or within nuclear-weapon-free zones.
Further, China has called on other nuclear-weapons states to negotiate a treaty promising “mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons” or to issue a political statement in this regard. Some scholars, including a number of American nuclear experts, believe that such a policy allows China to keep its nuclear weapons on low alert: Warheads and missiles are stored separately and are only mated in preparation for a potential strike. This approach could help extend decision-making time during a crisis and reduce the risk of accidental or unintended escalation.
Additionally, explicitly or implicitly communicating to the world that China’s nuclear warheads are stored separately from its intercontinental ballistic missiles during peacetime could help alleviate unfounded concerns about a sudden first strike. Such a signal would reinforce the message that China has no intention of conducting a surprise nuclear strike.
Reviews are indispensable
History has shown that the issuance safeguards alone is insufficient. Investigations have revealed that many “broken arrow” incidents and other nuclear-related failures resulted from a series of consecutive mistakes made by multiple operators. In many cases, the mistakes could have been prevented if all those who were involved in the operation of nuclear weapons had followed the safeguards fully, yet all chose to take shortcuts to lessen their workload, thereby missing all the checks. This taught us a lesson: Concrete actions must be taken to ensure the effective implementation of all safeguards and achieve full compliance with regulations. This underscores the importance of regularly conducting internal nuclear fail-safe reviews.
Nuclear fail-safe reviews are also imperative for states possessing nuclear weapons in the face of new and evolving risks. As international tensions rise and new technologies continue to advance, the risks of unauthorized, inadvertent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons are increasing.
First, communication channels between nuclear-weapons states are diminishing to the point where the international nuclear arms control mechanism is on the verge of collapse. New START, the only remaining disarmament treaty, expires in 2026, and there is little time to negotiate a new treaty before then.
Second, the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology continues, with a growing number of de facto nuclear-weapons states and increasing access to such weapons by non-state actors.
Third, nuclear weapons and early-warning systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyberthreats, including sabotage, the spread of misinformation and disinformation by state and non-state actors and the risk of insider threats. These could undermine the integrity of nuclear command, control and communications systems (NC3), making them susceptible to manipulation and miscalculation.
Fourth, the rapid advancement and military use of artificial intelligence have accelerated decision-making, raising the risk that AI could replace humans in nuclear-related decisions. AI could also overwhelm decision-makers with excessive information, while digital biases in AI training may lead to miscalculation.
Fifth, the vulnerability of space systems makes them prime targets. If an adversary loses its “eyes” in space, decision-makers may be more inclined to resort to nuclear weapons.
Sixth, with the rapid development of technologies — particularly with regard to the cyber realm, AI and space — decision-making time for leaders is shrinking sharply. They are pressed to make quick decisions based on what might be a false attack warning or miscalculation. The entanglement of conventional and nuclear weapons makes things worse.
That’s why internal nuclear fail-safe reviews should be conducted on a regular basis to guarantee that all nuclear-related technologies, procedures, policies and regulations are kept up to date with the latest developments.
Valuable opportunities
In addition to the unilateral actions that enhance nuclear fail-safe, it’s also imperative for nuclear-weapons states to collaborate through Track II, Track 1.5 and ultimately Track I dialogues to establish and implement bilateral and multilateral risk reduction measures — including establishing rules for emerging technologies and new domains — enhancing the predictability of all parties’ behavior and extending warning and decision-making time for policymakers. Former diplomats, military officers and security officials from 11 countries, including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and others, have already issued a joint statement calling for the advancement of global nuclear fail-safe. As a member of the P5, Beijing should find it desirable to be included in future discussions.
Given that nuclear fail-safe is a bipartisan concern in the United States, engagement with China in this area could be more stable and sustainable than many other areas of bilateral cooperation. China would welcome the sharing of America’s experience with nuclear fail-safe, including the two independent reviews. In return, China might be open to offering its own perspectives, provided it does not feel pressured by the United States. Such communication could serve as a valuable stepping stone for continued U.S.-China dialogue, helping to reduce risks and tensions.
Further, the P5 and the NPT “prepcom” could serve as key platforms for future multilateral cooperation on a nuclear fail-safe regime in which China could play an active and constructive role. Such collaboration would strengthen global security and work to the benefit the entire international community.
