A significant step in the Biden administration’s effort to realign NATO is the attempt to link the Atlantic and Pacific strategies. The U.S. is doing this in part by amplifying the so-called China threat in the Asia-Pacific and exporting the NATO concept of alliances against big powers.

What has evolved is a sort of pseudo-multilateralism in Europe and Asia. After the Cold War, ASEAN developed into a mature community. But with the increasing hype of regional tensions came the idea that Asia can only be safe when relying on a NATO-like military grouping featuring live ammunition.

The systemic challenge for the U.S. is not China but the worst inflation in 40 years. In fact, fragmentation does not seem to be happening in the real world. Even an Asia-Pacific version of NATO will not likely divide the region, as China will continue to be a major trade partner.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his invasion of Ukraine on February 24, he envisaged a quick seizure of Kyiv and a change of government analogous to Soviet interventions in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. But it wasn’t to be. The war is still raging, and no one knows when or how it will end.

The Russia-Ukraine war has had a direct impact on China-U.S. relations, with American rhetoric putting China in a difficult position. Going forward, prevention of conflict between the two big powers depends not only on their own actions but also on the entire international community.

The raging Russia-Ukraine conflict is a stark reminder of the urgency of effective management of weapons of mass destruction. The international community must come together to restart the long-stalled international negotiations over arms control and nuclear disarmament by fully utilizing the existing mechanisms and platforms and generating greater consensus and impetus among all stakeholders. A staunch supporter of the international arms control and nuclear disarmament regime, China adheres to its longstanding nuclear policy of maximum restraint and remains committed to the pursuit of a new path leading to a world of enduring peace and stability.

The dominant narrative on the Chinese side is that this strategic competition between the two countries reflects the struggles for power, institutions, and perceptions, which will last throughout the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In general, it is thus believed that competition and struggle have been adopted as key words for both Washington and Beijing in managing their relations.

Up till now, the fighting has been going on for over 100 days, with the two warring sides still in an offensive and defensive stalemate. Questions about this ongoing crisis can be listed in a long line, most of which no one can answer at this time. Yet among all the uncertainties, one thing is certain: what the Russian troops crossed on February 24 was not simply the land border between Russia and Ukraine, but rather more symbolically, the River Rubicon of the post-cold war international order.

Alienating Russia will not increase stability for Europe, nor will Russia disappear as a result of the Ukraine war. But Russia’s old power model — needlessly using force to punish countries for switching sides — needs to change.

Besides tackling COVID-19 and climate change, a unifying force within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is undoubtedly the member countries’ response to China. As the May Quad summit is underway, analysts must assess both how the Quad will react to China as well as how China will respond to the Quad alliance.