In The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, historian Nicholas Mulder reminds us that even when Britain and Russia were savagely battling each other during the 1853-56 Crimean War, they continued to service their debts to each other. Likewise, when hedge funds launched predatory attacks on Asian currencies during the 1990s Asian financial crisis, they ultimately still played by the rules (even though their unethical behavior brought some East Asian countries’ economic progress to a halt).

Vietnam and India still have a long way to go to compete with China. Control of the pandemic, selective resumption of production and continued strengthening of its supply chains globally will keep China on top for some time.

Economic globalization — with more participants — is in Europe’s interest. Following the lead of the United States and kicking Russia and its allies out of the international system will only cause global fragmentation.

China has taken a path toward common prosperity that is different from that of the United States. It hopes to explore a Chinese solution characterized by modest, sustainable lifestyles that avoiding the overconsumption of the West. The race has just begun.

Semiconductor chips have come into the public consciousness due to an ongoing shortage of the essential tech. Yet the U.S. government has yet to expand domestic chip production, instead reinforcing punitive measures on China’s market-dominant chip industry.

Containment or isolation of the Chinese economy makes little sense because it means all countries will lose out from the reversing of globalization.

Growing tensions between China and the U.S. are nothing new, but the consequences of geopolitical exclusivity continue to compound. No country wants to be forced to choose between the first and second largest economy in the world.

The concept of two pillars has gathered momentum worldwide. China may get more tax revenues from the first reform, and the second will have minimal impact. Global tax reform will also have a negligible effect on China’s foreign investment.

China-U.S. relations are the main stress point in the present-day world, and the U.S. has yet to accept China’s bottom lines. While chilly political relations and warm economic ones are the new normal, it is still possible for the two to meet halfway.

China, the United States and India have different strategic goals and so their interests conflict — so much so that strategic suspicion has fostered a negative kind of competition in which the other side is labeled as a primary rival. Of course there is a way to break the impasse. But it boils down to whether the parties really want to.