When discussing the global order and China's foreign policy, we must examine how China adapts its foreign policy to changes in the global order. There is a debate on whether we are returning to a Cold War-like situation. Many believe we are, drawing parallels between the current U.S.-China competition and the former U.S.-Soviet rivalry, which shaped the international power structure.
However, I argue that the Cold War was a specific ideological competition between major powers, distinct from general power rivalries throughout history. Major powers have historically competed for various reasons, such as land, resources, wealth, or global influence, but the Cold War was about ideological expansion – converting other countries to one's political system or ideology.
China must consider whether this is a bipolar situation requiring ideological expansion to win the competition. In my view, no side can win through ideological expansion in the digital age, as ideology is not an instrument for technological integration. Proxy wars were useful for ideological expansion during the Cold War, but today, changing a country's regime does not guarantee technological superiority or economic progress over rivals.
The current global order is characterized by counter-globalization, a reversal of the post-Cold War globalization trend. Globalization involved marketization -joining the global market - and democratization -strengthening human rights norms. Counter-globalization undermines these principles through policies like decoupling - reducing international cooperation, and disregarding human rights norms, as seen in the Gaza conflict.
The digital age has changed the dynamics of power and wealth generation, with data and cyber security becoming increasingly crucial for economic and national security. China must prioritize developing its digital economy and technology to compete with the U.S. in this domain.
While the US has more strategic partners, China and the U.S. will likely widen their economic gap with other countries in the next decade, strengthening the bipolar configuration. China must face this reality and adopt strategies to narrow the power gap, not just in GDP, but also in technology, military, culture, and other fields.
In shaping a favorable environment, China should work with other countries to establish commonly agreed upon rules for the global order, as the US lacks clear rules beyond self-interest. However, garnering support from US allies may be challenging.
As the world is undergoing counter-globalization, a concerning reversal from progress. China must adapt its foreign policy to this digital age, focusing on technological competition rather than ideological expansion, while navigating the emerging bipolar power structure and striving for a rules-based global order.
Globalization has stopped not only in economic fields and global governance for issues like climate change, but also in advancing and consolidating human rights norms. The question is how to deal with this shift - should we go forward, reverse it, or stop it? It's difficult, and historical trends are sometimes too strong for humans to stop, but should we follow this trend or try to slow it?
Another factor for China considering foreign policy is the digital age, where wealth and security relate to the cyber realm we've never experienced before. More wealth is generated from cyberspace, and life/security is increasingly related to cybersecurity as the digital economy accounts for a growing share of GDP globally. Digital technology makes cybersecurity as important as physical security.
If China wants its economy to grow faster than others, it must focus on developing its digital economy. Having an advanced digital economy means accumulating wealth faster than the US, Germany, Japan, etc. Meanwhile, advanced digital technology is needed to protect cyber security.
In terms of strategic relations, the U.S. has more allies than China due to its emphasis on military alliances versus China's non-alignment principle. But economically, the US accounts for 24% of GDP while China is 17.7%, dwarfing other major powers at less than 1/4 of China or 1/5 of the U.S.. In the next decade, the US and China will likely increase this economic gap with other powers, and possibly with each other depending on strategies - but a US-China bipolar configuration seems likely to strengthen.
No matter who is elected U.S. president, they will view China as the major rivalry for the next 10 years at least. China is at a disadvantage in this strategic balance and must deal with it.
If the world was continuing to progress with more human rights respect, cooperation, and interest in morality, it would be relatively easy for China. Unfortunately, history seems to be retrogressing. In the last 100-120 years, technology progressed linearly from telegraphs to 5G. Industry shifted from labor to capital to tech to knowledge to data-intensive. But international relations evolved differently - 100 years of peace before WWI, then WWI deaths, 22 years of peace, then even more WWII deaths on a greater scale, then the Cold War with less deaths through proxy wars, then the post-Cold War period with reduced civilian casualties in conflicts...until the Gaza war created over 30,000 civilian deaths in three months, an alarming reversal.
In this digital age, China must account for these negative dynamics when formulating its foreign policy to protect its development and national rejuvenation goals amid this "centenary change" reversal.
In the digital age, wealth is based on data, an artificial resource made by humans, unlike natural resources which are finite. Theoretically, the more data is used, the more is generated - an unlimited resource. The more you consume, the more data there is.
However, data alone cannot generate wealth. You need data technology to collect the data. Then it must be processed and categorized through data analysis. After that, technology is needed to monetize the data by selling products and services utilizing that data. Consumption then enlarges the data resources again. That's why the digital economy grows exponentially faster.
If China cannot make this cycle successful, it cannot compete with the U.S. in the coming economic competition focused on digital technologies and capability for rapid wealth generation from data integration.
Even more recently, ChatGPT and similar AI have shown individuals can produce like factories by combining their brain with AI assistance. If China does not compete with the U.S. in this arena but focuses only on ideology, it will hurt itself. That's why China says it has no interest in ideological confrontation with the US, no matter what they say or do.
The US policy objective is to contain China's technological progress, but not comprehensively like with the Soviet Union across all domains. The US still needs China's consumer market, so it only wants to decouple China's technology development through strategies like the "small yard, high fence" - establishing technology clubs that exclude China from setting standards.
The U.S.-China bipolarity is different from the Cold War dynamics. When the U.S. defines China as a major competitor requiring partial decoupling and containment strategies, that stance is locked in regardless of which president is elected.
Importantly, the Biden administration no longer uses the term "globalization" in official documents, having abandoned it in favor of "internationalization" when describing relations between just a few countries. This reflects the U.S. abandoning globalization as benefitting China over the US.
Both Trump and Biden administrations engaged in protectionism, abandoned human rights norms when inconvenient, and use ideology merely as an instrument when it supports US strategies against China - not out of any genuine commitment to spreading democracy and rights.
China has no interest in ideological confrontation either, as its political system with "Chinese characteristics" centering on Communist Party leadership is uniquely national and cannot be universally exported like past communist ideologies.
Let me discuss China's strategic goals. Aiming low is to avoid any new Cold War dynamics and proxy conflicts benefitting the U.S. Higher aim involves narrowing gaps with the U.S. across economic, technological, military and cultural domains - a tremendous challenge. Ultimate goal is to shape a favorable global order aligning with China's interests, yet this seems extremely difficult.
Finally, I want to summarize the differences between the Cold War order, post-Cold War order, and the current/emerging global order composed of values, norms, and power distributions.
During the Cold War, the values represented competition between capitalism and communism. After, American liberalism dominated global values with free markets, human rights norms, etc. Now, liberalism is declining not due to capitalism or communism, but the rise of populism - which first gained momentum in Western democracies themselves.
The sovereignty norm governed nation-state behavior during the Cold War as the most compelling principle, even if not universally adhered to base on the UN charter. Post-Cold War, human rights became more prominent than sovereignty. Now both sovereignty and human rights norms have diminished influence over state conduct.
The Cold War saw bipolar competition between the Soviet Union and US, with U.S. domination after. We now have decentralization of U.S. leadership, but not an even power divide between the U.S. and China - there remains a gap favoring the U.S.
This u-turn from globalization to counter-globalization puzzles academics - who steered this reversal? My view is globalization created international and domestic polarization. Internationally, the G20 claims 85% of GDP, leaving only 15% for the other 150 countries who were unhappy. Domestically, the wealth gap grew between the rich and middle class in advanced nations during globalization, fueling populist backlash against the liberal elite seen as driving it.
Populism empowered leaders promoting economic security by reducing foreign competition and immigration to insulate domestic jobs. Though this malleable "economic security" concept lacks clear definition or boundaries, policymakers invoke it to legitimize deglobalization policies curtailing international cooperation. Some countries isolate entirely, fearing interdependence. As major powers imitated each other's deglobalization, it became a self-reinforcing trend.
We're now in an unhealthy era of reversing globalization. While individuals may have limited ability to change this, we should at minimum not support these counter-globalization behaviors undermining progress.
