Counting on the United States to contain China has come at a heavy price. Worse, Australia’s strategic value as a middle power will be eroded dramatically if it continues to bash China in an era of uncertainty in which one can hear faint echoes of the drums of war.

As a former U.S. colony, the Philippines has maintained close ties with the United States on security issues for decades, and may quickly become a key player in Washington’s plans in the Indo-Pacific as China tests their claims across the South China Sea.

The EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific calls for a “meaningful European naval presence in the region.” What does it mean for vested parties in the South China Sea?

The U.S.’s China Policy directly impacts Canada’s China Policy. And with little change in U.S.-China relations under the Biden Administration, Canada’s policy space between China and the U.S. has stayed relatively the same as well.

Australia’s outlier history as a “Western” nation situated in the Pacific means it’s caught in the middle of simmering global tensions between China and the U.S.

The rhetoric of the United States is designed to stoke fear and amp up tensions so that it can more easily form an alliance against China. Playing up the threat theory, however, only shows helplessness as China exercises its maritime rights.

More efforts are needed by China and the Philippines to relieve tensions over the presence of Chinese vessels. Variables such as a mutual defense treaty with the United States and the coming presidential election in the Philippines are possible inflection points.

The Quad’s loose confederation of democratic, U.S.-backed states in Asia and Australia was meant to stand-up to China’s economic might, but it may have presented China with ample motivation to fight tooth-and-nail for recognition.

When two highly motivated powers compete for influence, its defenders prepare for the worst - full blown military conflict. The cost of deadly conflict must weigh heavily on the minds of national leaders before they take their next steps.

The Quad Security Dialogue will not get far, mainly because three of its members don’t want to compromise relations with China. The dialogue will likely focus on form over content and symbolism over substance. It will do little to shape Indo-Pacific geopolitics.