Norms, or generally accepted modes of behaviour, have provided a quicker and more flexible approach than international law for governing actions in cyberspace. While both China and the United States have begun discussing such behaviour in terms of international law, it currently seems unlikely that an agreement, or even trust, will be reached in the near future.

Although a rules-based and law-based approach in the international arena is an admirable aspiration, law will not solve the dangerous problems in the South China Sea. More specifically, the upcoming ruling in the case brought by the Philippines against China before an arbitration tribunal under the U.N. Convention the Law of the Seas will not solve the problems or even make a major headway in resolving them. An examination of the issues before the tribunal and its most likely decisions demonstrate that the tribunal and law can make only a very limited contribution to resolving the South China Sea crisis. Law will not save us from continuing to focus predominantly on negotiations and power politics.

To predict, prevent and manage crises, especially those triggered by third-party factors, should become the top priority in China-U.S. strategic consultations, in order to establish higher levels and broader scopes of risk-prevention and control mechanisms.

China regards both the U.S. and Iran as important partners, which is why Beijing played a major role in putting together the Iran nuclear deal. Implementing that plan will face challenges in both the U.S. and Iran, and China’s commitment to building a new type of major-country relationship with the US means it will continue to assist both countries to keep the deal moving forward.

The U.S. decision to remove all restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam does not aim to militarize the South China Sea dispute or contain China. Rather, the decision was but the latest move among the great powers to pursue their interests in Southeast Asia, which for the United States focus on discouraging China or anyone else from using military power to pursue a coercive solution to territorial conflicts.

In a recent editorial, the New York Times accuses China of “playing chicken” in the South China Sea, which as Benjamin Reynolds argues, dramatically inflates the threat that China poses to the region and the United States. The critique is not militarism, threatening behavior, or the revision of international norms as such. Rather, the narrative outlined by the Times is the standard hawkish U.S. narrative about China and the South China Sea, which have preceded invasions in Vietnam, Iraq, and bombing in Libya, too.

The recent U.S. reconnaissance activities in South China Sea raises the question if another collision is looming in the air. After examining the existing international conventions and laws regarding airspace and maritime encounters, the author argues that the key to preventing another collision is for the U.S. to stop close-in reconnaissance operations near China’s waters.

Whereas aircraft carriers have long provided the U.S. naval primacy as floating islands, China is creating its own artificial islands, complete with deep channels, harbors, berthing areas and airfields, all manned by thousands of troops, to counter that primacy. The consequences of a military clash could easily be disastrous and must be avoided. The politics of keeping the overall U.S.-China relationship on track is a particular challenge in the U.S. during a presidential election year, when candidates are posturing to an unexpectedly populist electorate.

The arbitration tribunal has put its own authority in question by redefining the case against China put before it by the Philippines. All nations should be concerned about what would become of China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea if we let UNCLOS serve as the sole exclusionary source of such entitlements.

Differences over freedom of navigation mainly originate from different interpretations of UNCLOS. As China extends the reaches of its maritime power, the operational capability at sea of the PLA Navy may be constrained due to the question of EEZ jurisdiction, which will invite cooperation with the US at appropriate times. The two countries would benefit from developing a common language on freedom of navigation.