Since reform and opening up, Chinese academia has focused its research on China-US relations: In both economic and scientific fields, China is chasing after the US and India is chasing after China. We must not forget about those who are after us by setting our eyes only on those ahead.

Outsourcing the North Korea issue to China has never worked, and it is less likely to work this time. There is no doubt that China's cooperation and coordination is important and perhaps indispensable, but the ongoing rising tension is making the totally unwanted bombing option only more likely unless Trump gets more creative.

Changing the goal from denuclearization to resuming talks is something worth trying, since other options are becoming dead ends or getting increasingly risky.

It will take much more from the U.S. to sway China, such as promising to remove the anti-missile defenses from South Korea if North Korea gives up its nukes, and promising not to move U.S. troops north, among other such ‘gives.’ Instead, the impatient and impulsive Trump Administration seems ready to assume China will not cooperate and move on to dealing with North Korea some other way.

As the North Korean nuclear issues escalates due to the rough state’s recent ICBM testing, the United States should seek a new approach to court Chinese cooperation on the matter. By offering carrots as well as sticks, the two countries can combat nuclear proliferation and address security threats at the same time.

Despite the ruling of the South China Sea arbitration case, the Chinese continue to use the waters in Filipino territory however they please. The Duterte Administration downplayed the ruling in order to try and strengthen economic and strategic ties with China, and the Philippines are paying for it.

The proposal from Beijing and Moscow could push the Korea nuclear crisis out of its dead-end. Yet there is a very long way to go for that to happen, considering the deep-rooted mutual prejudices, suspicions and the extreme lack of strategic trust.

For the past 12 months, the waters of the South China Sea have been fairly tranquil. However, long-time, and hence jaded, observers of one of Asia’s most intractable disputes understand the cyclical nature of tensions; and also know that given the unchanging central drivers of the conflict and the absence of collective political will to palliate those drivers and negotiate an equitable solution, periods of calm are invariably followed by strong tempests.

While Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics have dominated the news cycle since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, China’s activities in the South China Sea have drawn close lessons from the Kremlin’s playbook. Beijing’s embrace of the concept of modern hybrid warfare has been part of the regional power’s calculated bid to blur the lines between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ in pursuit of its maritime sovereignty claims and avoid outright provocation of its rivals – particularly the United States.

The current fuzzy state of geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific has prompted some middle powers in the region to explore new ties. In the foreseeable future, as long as the US remains in the Asia -Pacific, and China sticks to its peaceful foreign policy, US allies and partners will be reluctant to build informal or formal alliances.