The proposal from Beijing and Moscow could push the Korea nuclear crisis out of its dead-end. Yet there is a very long way to go for that to happen, considering the deep-rooted mutual prejudices, suspicions and the extreme lack of strategic trust.

For the past 12 months, the waters of the South China Sea have been fairly tranquil. However, long-time, and hence jaded, observers of one of Asia’s most intractable disputes understand the cyclical nature of tensions; and also know that given the unchanging central drivers of the conflict and the absence of collective political will to palliate those drivers and negotiate an equitable solution, periods of calm are invariably followed by strong tempests.

While Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics have dominated the news cycle since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, China’s activities in the South China Sea have drawn close lessons from the Kremlin’s playbook. Beijing’s embrace of the concept of modern hybrid warfare has been part of the regional power’s calculated bid to blur the lines between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ in pursuit of its maritime sovereignty claims and avoid outright provocation of its rivals – particularly the United States.

The current fuzzy state of geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific has prompted some middle powers in the region to explore new ties. In the foreseeable future, as long as the US remains in the Asia -Pacific, and China sticks to its peaceful foreign policy, US allies and partners will be reluctant to build informal or formal alliances.

After his first year in office, Rodrigo Duterte has arrived at three key realizations: first, it has become increasingly clear he doesn’t have the power to unilaterally shape his country’s defense policy; second is how far he can distance the Philippines from the U.S.; and third, expanding cooperation between the Philippine military and the Pentagon will constrain Duterte’s outreach to China.

Bhutan has protested that China is chipping away at its territory by building a strategic highway near the Tibet-India-Bhutan tri-junction in the Himalayas. Bhutan has security arrangements with India, and the construction has triggered a tense standoff between Chinese and Indian troops at the tri-junction while Chinese state media warns of the possibility of war.

With little prospect that the Navy will grow at the rates its leaders say are required to stem an eroding advantage over great power competitors like China, the U.S. Pacific Command, which uses the largest share of the forces the U.S. Navy provides, is moving aggressively to build alternative capabilities to establish sea control without relying on additional ships or submarines.

Achieving denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula should be the priority. The major concerns of all parties regarding national security should be understood, and an equilibrium point should be sought regarding security. Effectively managing concerns regarding THAAD is necessary to solve this difficult problem.

Why can’t the United States achieve its policy aims in North Korea? The main reason that the United States has failed to achieve its objectives is because it has tied its own hands behind its back - abjuring the use of diplomacy, that most classic of the instruments of state, even when diplomacy could help it to achieve national interest goals.

One of the primary responsibilities as president is to ensure the security of the United States as well as stability on a global level. To serve as a “threat minimizer” if you will. However, in the last five months, Trump’s clear disregard for these responsibilities only serves to further validate concerns about his qualifications to lead.