There has always been tension between China and India, but the recent standoff between troops of both armies at the border of Tibet, Bhutan, and Sikkim has only added fuel to the fire. Now, through the use of psychological warfare in addition to various other strategies, China hopes to intimidate India into backing down.

The standoff between Chinese and Indian soldiers on a remote Himalayan plateau entered well into its 2nd month. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesmen delivered one strong wording statement after another, calling for the withdrawal of the Indian troops and warning against miscalculations and unrealistic illusions of the Indian side.

US Cold War mentality and zero-sum game logic are fundamentally impeding the expansion of cooperation between the two armed forces. China’s innovation and development of military equipment should not be taken as a stimulus for competition. In fact they have provided the two armed forces with new opportunities for brand-new cooperation.

While issues in bilateral economic relations and trade are negotiable, the one-China policy is not. The Trump administration should carefully sum up the lessons of previous administrations on the Taiwan question and minimize its impact on overall China-US relations so that steady progress can be made, especially in economic relations and trade, which bring tangible benefits to both sides.

Almost a month after Indian troops entered Chinese territory, China has remained restrained and tolerant has fully demonstrated its sincerity for preserving Chinese-Indian friendship. As long as our side stays reasonable, restrained and proceeds from our best interests as well as concern about friendly bilateral ties, it is possible to narrow our differences, resolve our disputes.

The Modi government must reflect on the political drivers that have incited China to construct a road of marginal military value against a charged political backdrop. Hard as it might appear on surface to comprehend, the standoff is only secondarily about territory; principally, it is about the politics of the bilateral relationship.

Since reform and opening up, Chinese academia has focused its research on China-US relations: In both economic and scientific fields, China is chasing after the US and India is chasing after China. We must not forget about those who are after us by setting our eyes only on those ahead.

Outsourcing the North Korea issue to China has never worked, and it is less likely to work this time. There is no doubt that China's cooperation and coordination is important and perhaps indispensable, but the ongoing rising tension is making the totally unwanted bombing option only more likely unless Trump gets more creative.

Changing the goal from denuclearization to resuming talks is something worth trying, since other options are becoming dead ends or getting increasingly risky.

It will take much more from the U.S. to sway China, such as promising to remove the anti-missile defenses from South Korea if North Korea gives up its nukes, and promising not to move U.S. troops north, among other such ‘gives.’ Instead, the impatient and impulsive Trump Administration seems ready to assume China will not cooperate and move on to dealing with North Korea some other way.