Trump’s re-election as U.S. president introduces new uncertainties into China-U.S.-Japan relations. His protectionist, anti-global tendencies were laid bare during his campaign, when he pledged to impose a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and a 10 to 20 percent tariff on imports from its allies, including Japan. He also demanded that U.S. allies shoulder a greater share of the cost of military alliances.
While former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stabilized the U.S.-Japan alliance by fostering a personal relationship with Trump, the current prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, appears to be off to a rocky start. His request for a meeting with Trump around the APEC and G20 summits was declined, and his phone conversation with the president-elect lasted only five minutes — shorter than the 12-minute call between Trump and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.
In contrast, interactions between Beijing and Tokyo have noticeably warmed in recent days. On Nov. 15, President Xi Jinping spoke with Ishiba on the sidelines of the APEC summit, and both sides reaffirmed their commitment to comprehensively advancing the China-Japan strategic partnership. Earlier in November, Japanese National Security Adviser Takeo Akiba visited China for a high-level political dialogue with Wang Yi, director of the office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China and minister of foreign affairs.
Some analysts suggest that the rapid rapprochement between China and Japan is driven by the significant uncertainties introduced by Trump 2.0. While this reasoning has merit, the sustainability of improved China-Japan relations does not rely solely on the Trump factor. During a recent visit to the United States, I felt deeply that one of the most significant outcomes of Trump 2.0 might be an opportunity for U.S. allies, including Japan, to pursue greater strategic autonomy. This, in turn, could create opportunities for the improvement of China-Japan relations in the long run.
First, Trump 2.0 will accelerate the strategic awakening and evolution of strategic autonomy among U.S. allies. Addressing the uncertainties caused by Trump 2.0 is a global challenge, and that is also true for Washington’s major allies. Over the past four years, the Biden administration has pursued a policy of “integrated deterrence,” which strives to strengthen NATO and the frameworks of East Asia and ASEAN. Economically, it imposes severe sanctions on Russia by deploying the “small yard, high fence” strategy in technology export restrictions against China and compels U.S. allies to follow suit.
The results seem evident: Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, most European nations and Japan have pledged to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and the U.S., Europe and Japan appear aligned on sanctions against Russia and economic restrictions on China. However, the real threat facing U.S. allies isn’t China or Russia but the decline of their own economic and technological competitiveness.
Take Europe as an example: Its energy costs are three to five times higher than in the United States. Consequently, local funds have to be reallocated from R&D to energy expenses. This year, leading European Union economies are projected to grow by less than 1 percent, compared with 5 percent in China. Similarly, Japan is grappling with severe aging and low birth rates, a sharply depreciating yen and high inflation, which significantly reduced votes for the Liberal Democratic Party in the recent election.
During Joe Biden’s presidency, U.S. allies may have hoped to benefit from alignment with Washington’s economic protectionist policies. However, any such expectations will be shattered by Trump 2.0. Many Japanese companies initially welcomed the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which offered substantial subsidies for addressing climate change. In contrast, Trump has made it clear that he intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement again.
All of this demonstrates the immense risks Japan would faces if it excessively alignins its economic strategy with the United States. It also highlights the essential role of strategic autonomy in sustainable economic development.
Second, Trump 2.0 signals that the U.S. will temporarily step back from the next wave of globalization. But Japan’s future security lies in its deep participation in globalization and regional integration and in improving China-Japan relations.
The driving force behind this new wave of globalization is the unfolding technological and industrial revolution, with the Global South taking center stage. New drivers, such as economic digitalization, green development and intelligent systems, are poised to help countries and regions that were not fully engaged in the previous wave of globalization.
At the same time, East Asia is rapidly advancing its next phase of regional integration. For example, ASEAN and China have substantially concluded the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 3.0 upgrade negotiations, marking not only a closer connection between the Chinese market (1.4 billion people) and the ASEAN market (600 million people) but also the simultaneous advancement of high-quality upgrading, digitalization, green initiatives and urbanization. This creates an enormous market of middle-income consumers — 25 percent of the global population.
One of the pressing issues in current global economic governance is insufficient market demand. Globalization and regional integration are essential pathways to restoring confidence. While Trump 2.0 may result in U.S. disengagement from global climate governance and negatively impact the global green economic transition, it will not alter the overarching trend.
For instance, electric vehicles accounted for only 10 percent of U.S. car sales in 2023, compared with 40 percent in China. In July 2023, Japan and 10 other countries reached a new protocol for the TPP, demonstrating Japan’s commitment to advancing regional free trade even in the absence of U.S. participation.
Trump 2.0 is fraught with uncertainties, but it will accelerate the evolution of political, economic and strategic autonomy among U.S. allies. Japan needs to seize this opportunity to establish a bilateral relationship with China that aligns with the demands of the new era and not be swayed by U.S. influence.
