The Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump 2.0 remains unclear, although consensus has been reached on major power competition. If a new Indo-Pacific Strategy now emerges to build U.S. advantages against China, it will be designed to serve core MAGA goals.
In early 2018 President Donald Trump endorsed a strategy for the Indo-Pacific developed by his National Security Council through the course of 2017. Sources say Australia, led by Malcolm Turnbull (left), had a significant influence on the document formulated by the US. (AP: Pablo Martinez Monsivais)
Since the inauguration of Donald Trump on Jan. 20, the U.S. administration has concentrated mostly on domestic reforms and ending conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East conflict. It seems to have put little effort into the Asia-Pacific region. Its main moves related to the Asia-Pacific have been Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s hosting the Quad foreign ministers meeting on Jan. 22 and Trump meeting with the Japanese and Indian prime ministers in February. The latest news is U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s trip to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the military base in Guam. He visited the Philippines and Japan starting on March 24.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump 2.0 remains unclear — although the idea was put forward during his first term, and major power competition has been a bipartisan consensus. It will likely continue to be pursued. Whether or not there will be an Indo-Pacific Strategy 3.0 to rebuild U.S. advantages against China, serving core MAGA goals will be both the starting point and the major goals of Trump’s Asia-Pacific policy.
Since being proposed in 2017, America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has evolved from a theoretical concept into mechanisms in multiple areas. The main measures of the strategy during Trump 1.0 — which proclaimed a “free and open” Indo-Pacific — included diplomatically prioritizing the upgrading of such bilateral alliances as those with Japan and South Korea, actively roping in India and reviving the Quad and elevating it to a foreign ministers meeting.
Militarily, it implemented the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, renaming USPACOM as USINDOPACOM, expanding “freedom of navigation” activities in the South China Sea and incorporating Taiwan into the Security Partners framework. Economically, it took a series of steps, together with allies and partners (such as Japan and Australia) to support regional infrastructure, energy security, digital economy and cybersecurity, such as the Blue Dot Network, Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership and the Asia EDGE Initiative. The “Indo-Pacific Strategy” of Trump 1.0 consolidated unilateral military capabilities, but it accomplished little for the lack of an overall economic framework. Constant conflicts with allies arose. Overall, its achievements were limited.
During the presidency of Joe Biden, the Indo-Pacific Strategy entered a stage of mechanism development. The Biden administration continued Trump’s strategy of competition with China, pushing forward the Indo-Pacific Strategy to shape the strategic environment around China. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was published in February 2022, proposed five pillars: openness, connectivity, prosperity, security and resilience; and it systematically expounded five goals and 10 action plans.
The Biden administration consolidated sci-tech and security coordination with allies and partners through such minilateral mechanisms as the Quad, AUKUS and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea and U.S.-Japan-Philippines cooperation. It upgraded U.S.-ASEAN relations into a comprehensive strategic partnership, held the U.S.-Pacific Islands Country Summit to actively expand influence in the South Pacific and proposed the IPEF to make up for its economic weaknesses. However, constrained by such factors as the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as by the conflicting interests of some allies, they accomplished less than expected.
Following Trump’s return to the White House, the new administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 3.0 will be based on the idea of “America first” to project Trump’s personal policy preferences and working style, and demonstrate more unilateralism, transactionalism and uncertainty.
First comes a strategic contraction and resource concentration, evolving from global dispersion to concentration on the Indo-Pacific region. Judging from policy statements by Trump himself and by core members of his decision-making circle, Trump will continue his “neo-isolationist” tendency, reduce inputs in Europe and the Middle East, concentrate resources on the Indo-Pacific and focus on dealing with China.
Second is a utilitarian approach to alliances and partnerships, orienting at “transactional alliances.” While deepening defense cooperation with allies and partners, the Trump administration will ask Japan, South Korea and Australia to share more defense costs and trade economic benefits for security. It will attempt to deepen intelligence and defense cooperation with India, turn India into a fulcrum in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (asking India to buy more U.S. military equipment) and open its market to U.S. agricultural products.
Third is the pursuit of a policy of “peace through strength” to optimize military deployments, further enhancing them in the Indo-Pacific, including expanding America’s front-line presence at bases in Guam and the Philippines. It will deploy such offensive weapons systems as mid-range missiles, accelerate the arming of allies and partners (and maritime ASEAN members) and increase joint drills and training with countries in the region.
Fourth is economic coercion, openly pursuing Trump’s “America first” agenda. The strategy may increasingly include pointing the baton of tariffs at Asia-Pacific nations to reshape regional trade rules and promote the reshoring of manufacturing. Japan, South Korea, India and ASEAN countries will be asked to reduce their dependency on China. And U.S. energy dominance and control over supply chains will be sought.
The diplomatic policy of Trump 2.0 will worsen uncertainty and instability in the Asia-Pacific. Regional countries on the one hand may make some compromises, hoping the United States will return to multilateralism over the next four years. On the other hand, they will hurry to consolidate their own strategic autonomy.
China's ability to shape the Asia-Pacific order is steadily increasing, and the willingness of neighboring countries to cooperate with China is also on the rise. Over the next four years, the Asia-Pacific landscape will further demonstrate the tension of the parallel existence of China-U.S. competition and regional autonomy. Interaction and cooperation between Asia-Pacific nations will, to a greater extent, determine whether or not the region can avoid the trap of a new cold war and proceed to a more inclusive multipolar order.
