Donald J Trump’s first term was marked by a precipitous deterioration in Sino-American relations. The unprovoked instigation of the trade war in response to a structural feature of the USD-dominated global economy, which rendered American exports uncompetitive not only in relation to Chinese exports, but exports from all emerging economies and parts of Europe at large, epitomised in full the thinking of many around Trump on China: even if the U.S. were to suffer from the inflationary pressures of self-defeating tariffs, it would still go through with imposing such restrictions on Chinese exports. Both sides may lose. Yet so long as the Chinese “lost more”, that was to be tolerated within the negative-sum paradigm.
The real tragedy undergirding such Manichean, twisted thinking wasn’t so much the casualties and collateral damage inflicted to both sides of the Pacific. It was instead the normalisation of a retributively driven mode of thinking in international relations – one couched in terms of “blame” and “fault”, “responsibility” and “culprit”. In lieu of uncovering and addressing the structural issues at hand, the focus was directed towards identifying politically convenient scapegoats. Indeed, the same kind of rhetoric was embraced effusively by Trump’s inner cabinet during the COVID-19 pandemic – with the pathogen conveniently and xenophobically branded the “Wuhan virus”. In place of introspection came the trenchant, almost supercilious tendency to deflect and parcel blame at the footsteps of others’ doors.
Indeed, the externalisation of blame for problems within America has morphed into a bipartisan consensus. Unbridled inflation? Blame China. Geopolitical fallout and wars in Europe and the Middle East? Blame China. Domestic unrest and socioeconomic inequalities? Blame China. From the most absurd and tenuous of causal attributions has grown a burgeoning consensus – that the root of most problems in contemporary U.S. is allegedly China, and that the solution to the deeply jaundiced state of politics must be containing and inhibiting China’s rise. In 2018, Benjamin Shobert penned an aptly titled book, “Blaming China: It Might Feel Good but It Won’t Fix America’s Economy.” Six years later, the Democrats have come to realise the perilous inflationary spiral in which a mixture of macroeconomic shocks and protectionist measures inevitably culminate.
Such thinking is lamentable – but also a given reality that any China-U.S. relations watcher must address. Gone are the days when ‘G2’ and ‘a new type of great power relations’ could be touted as possible proposals for the modus vivendi. This is especially the case as Trump looks set to return to power in January 2025.
Hope lies in recognising the power of the people
So where does hope lie? In my view, hope rests with recognising – and harnessing – the power of the people. China and the U.S. are much more than just merely their governments. Even when it comes to the state, we should differentiate between the central/federal, provincial/state, and municipal/county levels. Dangerous fatalism about the Sino-American relationship often arises from equating both countries with their governments, and their governments with exclusively the central/federal level.
I harbour no illusion about the trajectory of China policy on Capitol Hill. A Republican-dominated Congress – with a confirmed Republican Senate majority, and a very likely retained Republican House majority (the ongoing races are too close to call) – will not offer any meaningful counterbalancing to Trump’s China agenda. If anything, Republican and Democratic Congressmen alike would be seeking to one-up one another in performative hawkishness, both as a means of drawing media attention and eyeballs, and of cementing their appeal to the lower-middle and working class, which has become a definitive king-making force in swing states. The military-industrial complex will continually promulgate the view that China is ten feet tall, in order to ramp up defense spending and justify continual militarisation of the relationship.
To some extent, their efforts would be reciprocated by some voices in Beijing, who will argue that in face of a Trump presidency, all attempts to mend rifts and improve relations with Washington are futile. Security, and security alone, should be the country’s foremost priority in view of attempts to alter and shape China’s domestic governance. People-to-people exchanges, per their judgment, should be kept to a manageable and passable minimum, as China turns towards the Global South and the rest of the world as new regions of priorities.
Yet I remain cautiously hopeful that beyond the Beltways of the two states, hope can be found. In 2023, a survey found that roughly 25% of Americans aged 18 to 44 reported viewing China as an enemy, compared with 52% of those aged 45 and over. Such disparities are unlikely to be attributable to age or period effects – a more plausible interpretation is the cohort effect: that the generation in which these individuals were born and came of age, plays a key role in shaping their perceptions of China. Whilst older Americans may view China through Cold War-inspired lenses, younger generations are not bound by the same mental frames of reference.
Trying – even if we do not succeed – is the imperative.
The old “hawk-dove” dichotomy is unlikely to map neatly onto the discourse on Sino-American relations, going forward. A more constructive typology would be centered around the “endgame” of the actor in question – is the ultimate objective for both powers to “peacefully coexist”, or for one out of the two to achieve “total victory”? This spectrum stretches from one extreme of individuals who – perhaps with a Panglossian rosiness – believe that China and the U.S. can function as perfectly complementary collaborators; to the other, who subscribe firmly to the view that only regime change in one of the two countries can put a comprehensive end to the strategic competition between them. Fortunately, both extremes remain fringe views. Unfortunately, the latter has gained considerable traction over recent years.
Yet there are low hanging-fruits that should be prioritised. For starters, sub-national diplomacy – interactions between provincial and municipal leaders in China, and their counterparts in the U.S. – could go a long way in keeping trade lines and economic joint ventures alive. City-to-city academic and cultural exchanges can still play the pivotal role in enhancing mutual understanding and appreciation of one another’s strengths. This was a point I made to a visiting delegation of mayors from the American heartland in Hong Kong last year. In the medium to long term, the current crop of leaders in DC are unlikely to be driving the foreign and economic policies of the U.S. In their place would be the many, more grounded voices who currently occupy regional or local offices.
Furthermore, in lieu of having track-1.5/2 discussions and dialogues driven by more of the old guard, fresh ideas and new faces are needed. We need individuals who are unencumbered to captive, vested interests on both sides, to take the lead on identifying pockets of synergy and glimmers of hope in the bilateral relationship. Consider the anti-fentanyl crackdown – but also the centrality of Sino-American coordination on cracking down on trans-national crimes, including drug trafficking, online scams, and financial impunity. Even whilst mistrust rages between politicians, the bureaucracies – especially with a younger crop of up-and-coming officials – remain cautiously open to technocratic collaboration. Finding and harnessing such openings for alignment is absolutely instrumental.
Finally, hope does not come from merely empty talking and dialogues. Chinese and American bridge-builders should agree upon ‘third regions’ – spaces of relative neutrality – in which they can work side-by-side with one another. Multilateral and international institutions, such as the United Nations and World Bank, have long been viewed as potential arenas for such collaboration. Yet they, too, are subjected to captive forces skewing incentives in a distinctly polarised and politicised manner. This is a key cue for us to look to bottom-up civil society initiatives and entrepreneurship as alternative pathways to synergy. For instance, can Chinese and American philanthropic initiatives align with one another on addressing the sociopolitical risks and spillovers from the effects of climate change on agricultural produce in central and Eastern Africa? Very plausibly so.
Many of these ideas are indeed tentative – and will require further fleshing-out. Yet the hope is that with these directions, we are at least on a surer and more substantive footing, than generic bromides that would do little to assuage the rightful fears and angst of those who believe, as I do: China and the U.S. can and must peacefully co-exist.
