Growing tensions between China and the U.S. are nothing new, but the consequences of geopolitical exclusivity continue to compound. No country wants to be forced to choose between the first and second largest economy in the world.

America’s wounds are wholly self-inflicted, and it has only itself to blame. Many betrayals have been committed over the last two decades, including some against its own allies, undermining their trust.

Though the climate of international relations makes it feel like conflict could erupt at any minute, the complex ties and reliance the two nations have on each other make it an even messier affair.

Separation of individual issues is not possible, in China’s view. A different concept of Sino-U.S. relations is therefore needed. While U.S. President Joe Biden will need courage and wisdom to discard the current American policy, which is centered on the containment of China, that doesn’t mean sacrificing America’s global stature.

The U.S. president’s hands are tied by Democrats’ slim majority in Congress, and Republican are piling on the pressure ahead of elections. So it will be tough for the U.S. to change its policy course anytime soon, so long as those in policymaking circles stick to their views.

China’s “two lists” and “three bottom lines” clearly lay out China’s basic interests. If the United States truly wants to compete responsibly, it must respect China’s interests and understand its concerns. Only this approach can avoid a slide into conflict.

Why should shared interest in middle class development in China and the United States be a key driving force in the bilateral relationship today?

After moves by France, Germany and the Netherlands, the introduction of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific should come as no surprised. Two questions emerge: Is this new version of the strategy a follow-up to the United States or an independent strategic consideration? And how should China respond?

In Washington, relations between China and the United States are often seen in terms of ideology — a game in which both seek to export their political systems and topple the values of the other. But the more immediate question involves industrial policies.

An abundance of examples show that countries in Southeast Asia want to develop beneficial relationships with both the U.S. and China. Thus, the U.S. hedge against China in the region is doomed to fail, despite the best efforts of visiting American officials.