Abe’s expansion of Japan’s military capabilities—even within the new “guidelines”—could allow later American administrations, realizing that U.S. strategic interest demand non-confrontational relations with China, to conclude that Japan does need or warrant defense by the United States.

Japan’s PM Abe’s amnesia toward past military crimes and general xenophobia calls into question whether a U.S. alliance with Japan is in the U.S.’s best interest – especially in dealing with the challenges on the Korean peninsula.

Despite a recent Pew Research survey indicated that two-thirds of Japanese do not want a more active military, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the U.S. saw the release of new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” which risks U.S. involvement in Japan’s territorial claims.

Japan’s leader made a good show out of his US visit, but the struggle to nail down a TTP deal actually highlighted deep differences between the two countries. Meanwhile, Japan’s stance on revising history continues to irritate many in Washington as it does across Asia.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States is an important opportunity to carry forward his grandfather's legacy in seeking equal status with the U.S. in the area of security. “Abenomics,” which gives top priority to the "price of capital," features bold financial policy and flexible fiscal policy will not be compromised for the U.S.-backed TPP, though.

The term “Chimerica,” is liberal theorizing that assumes the more economically interdependent the U.S. and China become, the more peaceful the hegemonic transition of power will be. Realists theorize that there is ongoing comprehensive balancing, from trade to militarization, and free trade alone will not solve deep ideological and system differences. Improved relations require increased participation and less inequality on both sides of the Pacific.

The U.S. state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be remembered not only because few foreign leaders have been privileged to address a joint session of Congress, but for the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Neither Washington nor Tokyo should explicitly link a more robust U.S.-Japan relationship with deterrence against China’s rise.

Japan’s Constitution hasn’t been changed in 68 years, and prevents its military from staging rescue missions and other overseas operations. Brahma Chellaney encourages Japanese constitutional reform, with U.S. support, to act as a military balance in East Asia.

A key component of Washington’s military rebalancing strategy is improving its relationship with Japan. However, actions by Abe and some close associates reinforce suspicions of the attempt to legitimize imperialism through revised textbooks, visits by the PM to the Yasukuni Shrine, and reluctance to accept the history of “comfort women.”

Hilary Clinton’s established perspective on U.S.-China relations as the face of the “Pivot to Asia,” does not bod well for the bilateral relationship, writes Ben Reynolds. The existing Clinton ties with the Center for New America Security (CNAS), a hawkish, pro-interventionist think tank, further the claim that U.S. militaristic hegemony will continue to be the foreign policy toward China.