Successive white papers shed light on national leaders’ approach to reunification with Taiwan. All explain and respond to critics, emphasizing a policy of peaceful reunification and the implementation of the one country, two systems concept.

Worried about Taiwan’s fate, Washington imagines that the Chinese mainland might copy Russia and resort to force. Biden administration officials have said they want to see Taiwan apply the lessons learned from Ukraine’s resistance.

It’s imperative that the new “low” in U.S.-China relations doesn’t become the new normal. And understanding the historical connotations of the relationship, particularly regarding Taiwan, is imperative for paving the way for a better, more diplomatic future.

Pushing shamelessness and political amnesia to new heights, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi sneaked into Taiwan in early August for a visit that was a needless affront. Needlessly inflaming tensions, the trip was wrong at three levels: China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, relations with the United States and principles of international order anchored by the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation.

US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s arrival in Taiwan has incited a predictably strong response from China. Chinese warplanes have brushed up against the median line dividing the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese foreign ministry has warned of “serious consequences” as a result of Pelosi’s visit to the island. Chinese President Xi Jinping has told US President Joe Biden that “those who play with fire will perish by it.” And now, China has just announced a major military exercise with live-fire drills starting August 4 (just after Pelosi leaves Taiwan). The specter of military confrontation looms large.

In the midst of the Cold War, US policymakers became convinced that détente with China would best serve America’s strategic interests. It was only made possible after the question of Taiwan was handled with diplomatic dexterity. The magic formulation clinched after painstaking negotiation was US acknowledgement of the Chinese position that “there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China”.

Washington might believe that Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine will make China think twice about using force, or that China will be constrained by the CPC’s 20th National Congress. But this is a grave misunderstanding.

Three main problems must be addressed in advance to reduce risk: a possible accident arising from a military encounter, dangerous actions by the United States that touch China’s red lines and provocative rhetoric by members of the U.S. Congress.

By starting and sustaining a tech war against China, Washington has placed itself on the wrong side of history. Like its trade war, the battle in the high-technology sector will turn out to be difficult to win.

Twenty-seven top Chinese experts in international studies participated in discussions and surveys. Five major drivers, 10 major risk areas and several specific risk scenarios were identified.