The multilateral trading system faces an existential challenge as the United States and European Union seek to continue — or even expand — trade protectionism. If Donald Trump returns to the White House, there are good reasons to believe that he will try again to hijack the World Trade Organization. Meanwhile, protectionism by Europe only makes things worse.

When discussing the global order and China's foreign policy, we must examine how China adapts its foreign policy to changes in the global order. There is a debate on whether we are returning to a Cold War-like situation. Many believe we are, drawing parallels between the current U.S.-China competition and the former U.S.-Soviet rivalry, which shaped the international power structure.

Hiroshima highlighted the decline of Western influence in global economic governance. The group’s inherent inadequacy arises from the desperate effort by a small group of member nations to maintain their dominant position in the world.

After the Xi-Biden meeting in Bali, attention should turn in earnest to a global vision in which the two countries share a common obligation — supporting globalization and multilateralism — not only to manage differences but also to avoid economic fragmentation.

Positive trade mechanisms have emerged. China remains committed to developing its relationship with the U.S. The recent tension over Taiwan was controlled. Such things and others are a basis for optimism, not despair.

China’s economy has weather the pandemic as well as any other nation’s has in the last few years, but the future seems uncertain as the world order is reshuffled as borders and regulations return to pre-outbreak norms.

Globalization is at a crossroads. Compounded by U.S. geopolitics and the cost of economic development, de-globalization has huge economic and human damages.

In cyberspace order and governance, China is a global leader. It’s capacity continues to improve, and it has a major role to play in working toward a more peaceful, secure, open and cooperative digital future.

In The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, historian Nicholas Mulder reminds us that even when Britain and Russia were savagely battling each other during the 1853-56 Crimean War, they continued to service their debts to each other. Likewise, when hedge funds launched predatory attacks on Asian currencies during the 1990s Asian financial crisis, they ultimately still played by the rules (even though their unethical behavior brought some East Asian countries’ economic progress to a halt).

Vietnam and India still have a long way to go to compete with China. Control of the pandemic, selective resumption of production and continued strengthening of its supply chains globally will keep China on top for some time.