Trump has proven tougher on the South China Sea than his predecessor. So long as China plays its cards right, though, it doesn’t really matter what he does.

Building on the cooperation the U.S. and China have developed over the last two years on UN sanctions will be key to denuclearizing North Korea. However, the current sanctions also include loopholes China may need to work with the United States to close should North Korea conduct another nuclear or missile test.

Although the signing of the framework of the Code of Conduct is only a small step forward, it’s actually of great significance for China-ASEAN relations.

Recently, the US Secretaries of State and Defense announced a policy of “strategic accountability” on North Korea. What are the key components of this policy, and is it really anything new?

In Southeast Asia’s final frontier, the two ports of Kyaukphyu and Thilawa have emerged with two contrasting trajectories of development. The tale of these two ports in Myanmar do not only chronicle the varying differences in Chinese and Japanese approaches to foreign developments but also reflect a regional rivalry for clout.

Not possessing so much as an aircraft carrier, it was long believed that China had no intention and, more importantly, no capacity for projecting power abroad. As China becomes a global player, it is logical that Chinese military capacity be expanded to meet its obligations and interests abroad. China has already used its naval forces to protect economic interests in Africa and the Middle East.

Trump is trying to compensate for his diplomatic handicaps in Asia by stirring up antagonism against China. It won’t work.

ASEAN meetings almost always generate expectations of raising the South China Sea (SCS) disputes to the point where the success of the meeting boils down to how tough the adopted language is in the final official statements. Considering the breadth and depth of issues covered by ASEAN in its annual meetings, such reduction is unfortunate and unfair.

What China almost certainly desires is an independent but friendly buffer state. For that reason it resists U.S. demands to impose bone-crunching economic sanctions on the North. However, this stance reflects more than a desire to annoy America. Rather, Beijing sees it as a matter of national security.

Unprecedented threats to US national security, coupled with a volatile President besieged by domestic problems makes the threat of military conflict increasingly likely.