The first Chinese space station outside of its territory will open in Argentina in 2016 – a logical place for a satellite communication station located on the opposite side of the globe as China. Notably, China and Argentina have strengthened bilateral relations over the past few years through increased trade and loans. While the U.S. has historically remained out of favor, this development has alerted some U.S. officials.

China’s controversial new anti-terrorism law would require foreign companies to install “backdoors” to give authorities remote access to computers and networks, and has been placed under review due to Western concerns. Since China still has to rely on foreign technology in the immediate future, the law might have been used to tell the United States government not to engage in what Beijing called “reckless behavior,” or to further expose U.S. hypocrisy in its own cyber espionage practices.

China’s new anti-terror laws are in response to changing transnational terrorist networks and are intended to designate agencies responsible for anti-terror activities while defining the obligations of the state, society, enterprises, and individual citizens. U.S. IT companies are concerned that increased security and oversight will affect business operations, but Fu Xiaoqiang reminds that this is not unseen in U.S. law either.

Much has been made about the explicit acknowledgement of cyber-warfare forces within the People’s Liberation Army. Yet these revelations are neither groundbreaking nor constitute a formal strategic doctrine for cyber or military applications of information technology in the event of war. More interesting is the insights it yields in what appears to be a comprehensive Chinese “whole nation” approach to conducting cyber war, something that experts have suspected for many years.

U.S. companies and leaders have criticized China’s new counter-terrorism law for its increased surveillance mechanisms. Yet, the U.S. government cannot claim the moral high ground when it blatantly violates the rights enshrined in its own constitution. A serious challenge to state surveillance will not come from other states; it must arise from China’s own citizenry.

The Arab Spring was neither a transformation from authoritative political system to western democracy, nor a religious “Islamic Awakening.” Dr. Jin Liangxiang describes it as the reconstruction of political legitimacy, and primarily caused due to governments losing their legitimacy by not providing economically for the people. Externally imposed political systems will not solve the ongoing issues, though.

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently presided over a discussion on international security at the UN in New York. The principle of unity and multilateral cooperation, the basis of the original UN Charter, was the foreground to China’s continued calls for cooperation on investments, terrorism, and military trust mechanisms.

The U.S. is concerned over China’s new anti-terrorism law due to additional network security regulations that would affect its enterprises in China. Since Chinese governments, banks, and research institutes are almost entirely dominated by foreign IT companies, there is justified concern over domestic cyber security. Strict regulation in law could ensure that all investors are treated equally without favoritism.

The USCC assessment on the weaknesses of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) offered little new analysis on PLA’s cyber-warfare capabilities. This is due to impossibility of finding a comprehensive assessment of China’s military cyber capabilities on the public record. Much of the debate surrounding the PLA’s cyber war capabilities is mere speculation based on evidence of its undoubted success in cyber espionage.

Jia Chunyang discusses the outstanding features of the U.S. National Security Strategy report. In general, the new report is a basic follow-up to the Obama administration’s opinions about China as well as its diplomatic philosophy reflected in its 2010 edition. But it has a more confident tone.