The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which broke out in February 2022, marked the latest episode of the use of warfare as a tool to accelerate change in the world order. But two other events disturbed Asia and the Middle East: U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 and the Israel-Hamas conflict, which broke out in October 2023. People began to worry about potential interplay across three war zones. Such a prospect has become more prominent in recent months, and may be worthy of note by historians.
Three “war zones” connect
Since Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in Russia in early August, the West has increased its aid. Russia has also stepped up efforts seeking external support. Other regions have become involved in the conflict.
With the battlefield still resting at stalemate, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy began to market his victory plan to the West. Intensive discussions were held in Europe in mid-October, and Zelenskyy visited major European capitals. And then the EU held a foreign ministers’ meeting and a summit to discuss matters. The day before the EU summit, NATO held a defense ministers’ meeting. Two days after the summit, the U.S.-UK-France-Germany summit and G-7 defense ministers’ meeting took place.
Meanwhile, war seemed imminent between Middle East powers. At the beginning and end of October, Iran and Israel fired missiles at each other, and Israel attacked Hezbollah and Hamas throughout the month.
At the same time, the situation in the Indo-Pacific region was intensifying. In mid-October, Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and the rapid deterioration of relations between South Korea and North Korea disturbed many parties. At the end of the month, reports that North Korea had sent troops to aid Russia were deafening. South Korea urgently reached out to NATO, the EU and the United States for intelligence and coordination, with more aid for Ukraine in mind.
The several meetings in Europe in mid-October had more in common in terms of topics and participants than did the same meetings in the past. The foreign ministers’ meeting, the summit and the U.S.-UK-France-Germany summit all focused on Russia-Ukraine and Middle East issues. The NATO and the G-7 defense ministers’ meetings talked about the Indo-Pacific as well. For the first time, the NATO defense ministers’ meeting invited the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries — Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The EU participated in the NATO and G-7 defense ministers’ meetings. NATO took part in the G-7 defense ministers’ meeting. The EU itself is obviously more concerned about Russia, Ukraine and the Middle East, but it also has to engage in the discussion on Indo-Pacific issues.
Perceptions of blocs
The proposition of any concept marks a certain level of cognitive clarity. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush used the term “axis of evil” to describe countries that support terrorism, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Western politicians today have also begun to mention China, Russia, the DPRK and Iran together. For example, newly appointed NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting: “The war in Ukraine has shown that instability in Europe can have far-reaching consequences across the world, and that countries thousands of miles away — as far away as Iran, China and even North Korea — can become security spoilers in our own backyard. Our world is closely linked, and so is our security.” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken published an article in Foreign Affairs in early October referring to China, Russia and the DPRK as “revisionist powers.” Recognizing that these countries are not an axis and have not explicitly sought bloc confrontation, and that their relationships are transactional, he still found it necessary for the U.S. government to say this.
As a matter of fact, unlike BRICS, China, Russia, North Korea and Iran have never engaged in any systematic coordination. Nevertheless, like BRICS, a common identity for the four has largely been constructed by the West. The notion did not arise from the four countries’ own initiative but from the Western fear that the West-dominated international order will be subverted.
The bow is drawn
When the international order crumbles, it is almost inevitable that shocks will occur everywhere. In the transitional process, sometimes it is a matter of luck — or the lack of it — for a regional conflict to become a global one. However, as of the end of October, it seems sure that tensions are still not sufficient to trigger a world war.
First, the November elections in the U.S. pressed a “pause” button. This also reflects the near decisive influence of the internal affairs of the hegemon on the world system. With Donald Trump’s election, the level of American tolerance for “authoritarian regimes” is likely to rise and America’s hostility towards Russia and the DPRK might be reduced. Many important bilateral relations in the world will go through major adjustments.
Second, while inspiring some wild ambitions, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has also cautioned many about the risks and dangers involved. The U.S. and Germany seem to have declined some of Ukraine’s demands in its victory plan — such as NATO membership and more advanced weapons. Both Iran and Israel have demonstrated restraint and obviously do not want to provoke a full-scale regional war. Though highly symbolic, the North Korean troops will have limited impact on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. The impact of that move on Northeast Asia security remains to be seen.
Third, what happened last month manifests differences between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, along with similarities. China, once deeply integrated into the liberal international order, has virtually become the anchor of stability among the four. Its response to the DPRK’s move was near silence. Its Taiwan Strait exercise lasted only one day. And it reached an unexpected border agreement with India on the eve of the BRICS summit.
This seems to indicate that the transformation of the current international order will be a relatively long process. And that moment may not even appear.
