Fu Ying, Founding Chair of Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, China's former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Advisory Council of Munich Security Conference. This article was written on CA962 when she flew back after the MSC.
On February 14, 2025, at 1:30 PM, the 61st Munich Security Conference (MSC) opened at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof. I arrived early at the conference hall, but the 200 seats had mostly been taken and I finally found a spot back in the room.
The MSC chairman Christoph Heusgen, who opened the conference, praised the expanding range of topics and the growing diversity of participants at MSC. Touching on Ukraine, he emphasized the MSC goal of peaceful resolution of conflicts, stressing that the pursuit of peace through dialogue should be based on the rule of law, not the rule of strength. Earlier, on February 10, the MSC Report—insightful as ever—titled “Multipolarization,” used well presented data and graphs to illustrate humanity’s transition toward a multipolar world. The report mentioned “the opportunities for more inclusive global governance and greater constraints on Washington, long seen as too dominant a power by many.” It also cautioned about the risks of chaos and internal divisions, which may lead to disorder, intensified competition, and even a new arms race—both nuclear or conventional.
While the opening appeared calm on the surface, the Munich atmosphere had already been stirred by the speech of the newly-appointed U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made two days earlier (February 12) at NATO. He proposed a solution to the Ukrainian crisis excluding considering the 2014 border line and Ukraine’s NATO membership. He also suggested a post-war non-NATO peacekeeping force by Europe, called for European countries to take the responsibility for continental defense and to increase defense spending to 2-5% of GDP. When attending meetings upon arrival in Munich on February 13, I already heard from the European participants expressing concern and anxiety over the dramatic shift in the U.S. policy.
After the MSC opening, the first speeches came from the hosts and EU leaders. The German President, the Governor of Bavaria, and the President of the European Commission all emphasized the importance of maintaining strong transatlantic relationship, in an effort to restore confidence to the European and U.S. ties. They also responded to the American call for increased defense spending by considering legislative measures. The next is the turn of other leaders. This year, the conference was attended by over 50 heads of state and government, around 150 ministers, and leaders of major international organizations from more than 110 countries. Over 350 forums and side events were held throughout the conference.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s Speech Was Highly Expected
U.S. Vice President’s speech was scheduled at 14:30. When teleprompters were set up on both sides of the rostrum, the audience quieted down. Arriving five minutes late, JD Vance took the stage and started some pleasantries. However, he soon shocked the audience by making a lecture of democratic values siting cases in some European countries concerning freedom of speech etc. He did not address issues like European security, transatlantic relations, nor Ukrainian.
Vance criticized European governments for fearing public opinion, blocking the opposition parties, and straying from the shared values that the U.S. upholds. He urged Europe to bolster its defense capabilities and address the immigration issues.
His speech threw a depth bomb, swirling the conference off its feet. Over the next two days, the MSC agenda was more or less reshaped and the focus was shifted to the crisis in the transatlantic relationship.
There was a time when the Europeans were losing interest in the transatlantic ties and there was the talk like "Westlessness". Washington, which was growingly anxious about “China’s rise”, became concerned of the drifting away of its allies. The Biden administration made it a priority to restore and rebuild transatlantic relations. Secretary of State Antony Blinken famously declaring that: “we have to start by approaching China from a position of strength, not weakness...” After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the U.S. effectively leveraged European fears of Russia to restrengthen the transatlantic bonds.
Now, however, with the Europeans both emotionally and politically locked into supporting Ukraine and countering Russia—while Ukraine not gaining an upper hand in the battlefield—the U.S. has abruptly, and without consulting its allies, floated a ceasefire proposal and stated that the post-war responsibilities be taken by Europe alone. Unsurprisingly, this has left Europeans disoriented.
What’s the U.S. up to?
European analysts tried to dissect Vice President Vance’s speech, speculating on its underlying messages. Some said that it was more about American domestic politics than addressing the audience. Others suggest that Trump, still nursing grievances from what was perceived as European humiliation during his first term, is seeking retribution. Another theory posits that President Trump wanted to end the Ukraine crisis, and the European reluctance pushed him to bypass their concerns. Some historically minded thinkers declare—that the U.S. is no longer the uncontested leader of the “free world” and this is “the end of an era”.
From an outsider’s observation, the biggest challenge to Trump’s ambition to "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) is probably the nation’s economic realities. The U.S. national debt has surged to a staggering $36 trillion, amounting to 124% of its GDP. Deindustrialization is difficult to reverse and infrastructure is aging and rebuilding is difficult. The returning inflationary pressure adds to the burden. With business experience, Trump could see better than others about the economic strains and may feel more urgent to address the challenge. The administration’s priority is clear: reducing expenditures and bringing new revenues. According to the latest data, the U.S. shoulders 68% of NATO’s $1.47 trillion annual budget, and by the end of 2024, Congress had approved $175 billion in aid to Ukraine. The Trump administration is understandably unwilling to keep shouldering these immense financial burdens.
However, reducing Vance’s speech to mere economic calculations would be an oversimplification. It also underscores a growing ideological rift between the U.S. and Europe on societal values. The Republican Party sees its election victory as a mandate from the people—a rejection of entrenched liberal ideologies and a backlash against the neglect of public grievances. The younger generation of the new administration officials has displayed a noticeable arrogance when commenting on the domestic affairs of other Western nations.
The new US transactional policy which is perceived as disruptive by many has made the international scholars fumbling for the right terms to describe and its rate of succeeding is difficult to predict. Against the backdrop of the US global retrenchment, it deserves close observation about where it may take more expansionist or risky turns.
Fu Ying before Panel "Discussion Making Waves: Maritime Tensions in the Indo-Pacific" at Main Stage II.
What Are Europe's Options?
Europeans, who have been accustomed to the warm cuddling of the U.S. alliance, reacted initially with dismay and even anger. Some European officials voiced against the criticism by Vance of European systems and policies. They reaffirmed support to Ukraine, warning that without this commitment, Europe’s long-term peace could be at risk. Their concern was that the U.S. may no longer be a reliable ally. Some still hopped to convince the U.S. to turn around, even using China as an excusing—arguing that if the U.S. withdrew from Europe, China would seize the opportunity and become an increasingly potent threat.
However, more pragmatic voices in Europe are already strategizing on how to adapt to this shifting reality. They are considering whether it is possible to adjust European budgets to increase military spending in support of Ukraine and whether Europe could organize its own army. Many suggest that direct negotiations with the U.S. regarding Europe’s responsibilities in post-war arrangements should begin immediately. For example, if European countries are tasked with sending peacekeepers after the war, who should take the command? Will they receive U.S. air cover, intelligence sharing, and security guarantees?
President Zelensky arrived in Munich late on 14th to meet the parties concerned and addressed the Conference in the morning of the 15th. He stated that Ukraine will not accept any peace accords without the Europeans and that Europe should adapt to the new reality and act quickly to achieve its goals. His speech provided some consoling.
On one hand, Europeans are worried that they may be sidelined in decisions that will directly affect their security future. On the other hand, their divisions and economic weaknesses may hinder their ability to respond effectively to the crisis. The European position on Ukraine is complicated: despite strong rhetoric, there is yet a feasible peace plan or concrete resolution in the face of a long-lasting conflict. This leaves them in a precarious position, caught between ambitious objectives and practical limitations. After the MSC, French President Emmanuel Macron convened an emergency EU summit in Paris to consolidate Europe’s position and focus on a unified response which is followed by a series of consultations. Europe’s future choices are to be observed. Given the difficulty in bridging the gap between U.S. and Russian demands, finding an overall resolution will not be easy. The U.S. and Europe are likely to eventually find a compromise amongst themselves.
Expectations for China
Although this year's MSC agenda was somewhat sidetracked, discussions on the trend of global “multi-polarization” remained vibrant in certain circles. In these conversations, Europe often places China alongside the United States, acknowledging the unstoppable rise of China. Though bias and misperceptions exist, there is expectation for equal cooperation and dialogue between Europe and China.
In the discussions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China was frequently mentioned, with the participants keen to find out what role China might play. Would China be willing to join future security guarantees for Ukraine? Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s speech on February 14th at the MSC was commented as "the sober voice". However, some American scholars voiced concerns about whether China might seize the opportunity to influence Europe and strengthen the ties, potentially undermining Western unity.
Chinese scholars attending the conference generally believed that, according to China’s diplomatic tradition, it would not take an opportunistic view and exploit the U.S.-Europe divide. Nor would China naively assume that the deeply rooted political, value-based, and security systems among the U.S. and Europe would collapse with a single shock. For China-Europe relations, this moment offers both opportunities and challenges. If China and Europe engage in proactive dialogue and if Europe is able to independently consider its policies with China—free from other influences, and objectively manage the differences, the two sides should be able to focus on cooperation. That would benefit both parties and contribute to the stability of a multipolar world.
In his February 12 speech in Brussels, Hegseth defended the U.S. shift of policy by saying that the U.S. is “prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific”. This rhetoric mirrors the Biden administration’s justification for its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, claiming it was necessary for shifting focus onto strategic competition with China. Essentially, all these moves reflect the U.S.’s strategic retrenchment and reallocation of resources in response to its diminishing overall strength.
China needs to stay vigilant about what adjustments the U.S. will make in the Asian region. Will it manipulate with the regional conflicts to pose challenges to China, heighten friction, or even provoke conflict? The American strategic competition with China stems from a misjudgment of China's intensions. As Wang Yi emphasized in his Munich speech, China’s policy toward the U.S. remains stable and consistent, reflecting the strategic resolve and international credibility of a responsible power. China will continue to act as a factor of certainty in this time of change and strive to be a steadfast constructive force and to promote equal and orderly multi-polar world.
