“The incoming government has decided that it wants to engage with China after many years of a very poor, deteriorating relationship […] and the incoming Labour government wants to change that course.”
Veteran politician Peter Mandelson, former First Secretary and Trade Secretary of Britain, and the chief architect of New Labour, declared the above in a speech he delivered at the University of Hong Kong in September. His remarks came on the heels of a call between British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and Chinese President Xi Jinping – the first since March 2022.
Days after his visit, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves and her Chinese counterpart Vice Premier He Lifeng held a phone conversation, in which they discussed the prospects for improvements to trade and economic ties between the two countries.
A month later, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy made a swift visit to China. In Beijing, Lammy met with Executive Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during which they outlined their respective broad, strategic positions broadly in line with an improvement in bilateral relations, and went over disagreements and potential areas of collaboration that should be, by now, familiar to many observers of the relationship.
A few months ago, I wrote that the Sino-British relationship can only be repaired through a turn towards pragmatism in both Beijing and London, especially the former. Indeed, the Sino-British dynamics is presently undergirded by a strategic and pragmatic push for re-engagement – more conversations, more dialogues, and more indication of possible collaboration.
What gave rise to this push for re-engagement?
Explaining the Drive for Re-engagement
To paraphrase James Carville, “It’s the economy!”, after all.
The British economy is in a difficult state, to put it mildly. The economy fell into recession at the end of 2023, with the economy shrinking in two consecutive quarters. Despite a modest rebound in the first six months of the year, productivity growth has remained sluggish for long, as a result of low investment, policy unpredictability and errors, political instability, and the country’s self-destructive move of quitting the European Union. Whilst unemployment rates and inflation alike had declined by modest margins by the July election, fixing the economy remained an urgent task-at-hand for the newly elected government. Having campaigned largely on the platform of redressing the ineptitude and failures of the Conservative government, Keir Starmer is especially keen on fulfilling his electoral pledges of “economic growth and stabilisation”. Given that the UK trades far less with China than the US, Germany, or Japan – three fellow members of the G7 bloc – it only made sense to the new government that it caught up as soon as possible.
Such an economically centered rationale has been pivotal in spurring London’s newfound keenness to explore trade collaboration and financial synergies with China. Yet there was of course the delicate balancing act – how could No. 10 pursue a dethaw in relations with China, without coming across as unduly deferential to Beijing or pollyannish at large?
The strategic solution was identified in a narrative that indirectly reflected the growing significance and geopolitical heft of China beyond Asia. By emphasising the critical role of China as a potential mediator for peace over the war in Ukraine and highlighting that Britain and China can benefit from one another in tackling critical international challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and macroeconomic instability, the Labour government has sought to position itself as a constructive partner to Beijing on select salient issues, and a tactful critic on others. The “cooperate-compete-challenge” mantra is a familiar refrain.
Setting aside the domestic political preoccupations of Starmer and his circles, it is apparent that the diplomatic establishment – as a whole – is keen on cultivating a more comprehensive and carefully caveated foreign policy towards China, especially in face of a then-prospective and now-to-be-expected Donald J Trump return to the White House. Suffice to say, the Trans-Atlantic ‘Special Relationship’ renders it extremely difficult for the UK to adopt a divergent foreign policy stance on major issues from the US – the Suez crisis was a notable exception, but it also took place almost 70 years ago. Yet London can afford to pursue strategic differentiation – to seek and signal clearly subtle but important distinctions between it and Washington, whether it be over means or domains of interest, in relation to major powers such as China and the EU.
“The Golden Era No More”
Whilst improvements in communication and engagement is to be welcome, especially in light of the nadirs reached during the three most recent Tory Prime Ministers, such re-engagement has not translated, as of yet, into a substantive policy renewal. Nor should we expect a ‘reset’ and a return to the Golden Era of yore.
Firstly, the US political establishment has coalesced around a newfound consensus that China presents a fundamental strategic rival and challenger to the US-led international order. As a core beneficiary of this order, as well as the other half of the “Special Relationship”, the UK could ill-afford to alienate its greatest military and security partner, as well as a long-standing strategic ally on a significant number of international and geopolitical fault-lines. Indeed, as Trump returns to the White House, he is bent on settling his scores with China, which he faults for purportedly derailing his re-election campaign in 2020. The raft of bellicose China hawks surrounding him does not augur well, either; they will likely pressure Britain – amongst other states – into distancing itself from China, economically and financially.
Secondly, China has become a proverbial Bogeyman with which British politicians seek to ‘one-up’ one another in signaling their moral uprightness. Much of this is not fundamentally cynical: issues such as Hong Kong understandably occupy a position of great symbolic and emotional importance for many British politicians. As much as skeptics of theirs would suggest that their concern is both exaggerated and unctuous, what remains undeniable is that political conversations over China often touch upon highly charged and historically sensitive topics – ranging from colonial guilt and legacy, to the drastic “Great Reversal” of power between China and Britain, per historian Kerry Brown in his excellent work.
Finally, the British public’s attitudes have soured considerably on China. In late 2017, around a third of British citizens (36%) had a favourable view of China, with 44% holding an unfavourable view. By mid 2022, the numbers had shifted to respectively 13% favourable and 75% unfavourable – a stark sea change of attitudes. Nuances over grand strategies and foreign policies are often missed in the emotively charged public discourse. Public resentment is further inflamed by allegations of foreign meddling in politics – an issue that has received increasing salience in Western liberal democracies given the widespread suspicions that the 2016 US Presidential Elections had been meddled with by nefarious third parties. Even if the actual evidence grounding such beliefs remains thin, the perception of a “China threat” has become increasingly entrenched.
“But Could There Be a Silver Lining?”
Whilst the Golden Era is no more, I would suggest that a silver lining can be found. Whilst the return of Trump would certainly throw a spanner into the works, provided the Labour Party manages to retain power for the next three to five years – despite the ignominious scandals that have rocked the Starmer administration as of yet – there remains room for genuine collaboration in at least two domains.
The first domain concerns climate change. Both Britain and China place significant emphasis upon the reduction of emissions and pursuing a renewable transition in energy consumption, vehicle design, and other critical dimensions. The two countries should collaborate on improving efficiency and yield of renewable energy production, as well as optimising the design and construction of sustainable infrastructure – a field in which China has unique comparative advantage. Knowledge exchange between technocrats and data sharing in these relatively non-sensitive fields could prove to be very helpful in advancing the “green agenda” for both President Xi and Sir Keir Starmer.
The second domain concerns education and cultural exchange. Higher education has long been a crucial pillar of British soft power and economic revenue. As Sino-American tensions flare, it is likely that ethnic Chinese STEM students are seeking viable alternatives to studying in the US. The UK, with its depth and breadth of stellar academic institutions (such as the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge), can go a long way in absorbing the “talent glut”, whilst serving as an interface for Chinese talents and youth to interact with and learn from the West. Notwithstanding allegations of “espionage” and “interference”, what remains fairly clear is that a vast majority of Chinese and British students studying in one another’s country, are evidently invested in and keen on learning more about their respective economies, cultures, and histories. Strengthening such exchanges is hence key in ameliorating misconceptions and ensuring the formation of a more multi-dimensional, veracious, and realistic picture of the other.
If China and Britain are to get along, mutual understanding is key. Exchanges along these two “low hanging-fruit” dimensions should be permitted and encouraged to flourish. Only then, could we see and sow the seeds of hope in the relationship.
