Donald Trump can be regarded as the principal architect of the current wave of containment and suppression policies targeting China — policies that are unlikely to be reversed in any significant way in the short or medium term. The China policies of the Trump and Biden administrations can be expected to exhibit continuity, even though they are cloaked in a distinct style and language.
During Trump’s first term, U.S. policy toward China underwent a dramatic transformation, breaking away from decades of rational engagement and ushering in an era of intensified rivalry. Domestically and internationally, Trump’s approach was often perceived as unconventional and anti-establishment, deviating sharply from the practices of his predecessors. His policies stood out as a radical departure from the established norms of U.S. governance — to such an extent that his administration was widely regarded as an anomaly.
A curious dynamic has now emerged: Biden simultaneously acts as both Trump’s successor and, paradoxically, his precursor. Whether Trump’s second term will bring continuity or disruption in U.S.-China policy hinges on understanding the Biden administration as a pivotal reference point.
A review of Biden’s policies over the past four years, coupled with an analysis of the key differences between two election campaigns — Trump vs. Biden and Trump vs. Harris — reveals that Biden has largely sustained the trajectory initiated by Trump. The principal difference lies in the methods and degree of intensity employed in pursuing similar strategic objectives.
Trump’s first term was marked by several signature policies targeting China, including the imposition of sweeping tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States — a move that precipitated the so-called trade war — as well as the enactment of stringent restrictions on technology exports, cultural exchanges and investments linked to China. Over the past four years, the Biden administration has not only refrained from reversing these measures but, in many cases, has intensified them.
Beginning in 2018, Trump imposed additional tariffs on approximately $550 billion worth of Chinese goods, citing alleged “unfair trade practices” and “forced technology transfers.” Upon assuming office, Biden directed agencies such as the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce to review these tariff policies. However, rather than rescind them, Biden opted to reinforce them. In May 2024, for instance, he announced a significant tariff hike on $18 billion worth of Chinese exports, targeting strategic sectors such as electric vehicles, semiconductors, solar cells, lithium batteries and critical minerals.
In the high-tech domain, the Biden administration introduced landmark legislation, including the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, adopting a “small yard, high fence” strategy to achieve what it calls “fine-tuned decoupling.” These measures aim to restrict China’s access to advanced technologies in fields such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum information science.
While Biden’s rhetoric has been notably less confrontational than Trump’s, the substance of his technological competition remains fundamentally consistent. Indeed, the actual impact of these measures — particularly in fostering decoupling — has, in certain respects, surpassed what was achieved during the Trump era.
In the diplomacy and security realms, the Biden administration has expanded Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Security initiatives have been strengthened through frameworks such as the Quad dialogue (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) and the AUKUS alliance, while economic engagement has been reinforced through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Additionally, Biden has sought to substantively engage European nations with the region surrounding China. These efforts not only extend Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy but also add greater nuance and sophistication to its implementation.
Some of Trump’s actions during his first term — such as his phone call with Tsai Ing-wen, the local leader of Taiwan — immediately after his election, were viewed as highly provocative. However, the Biden administration has gone even further in its approach to Taiwan. For instance, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s highly controversial visit during Biden’s term was a significant breach of established diplomatic boundaries and red lines and is widely regarded as one of the most serious disruptions in the Taiwan Strait since the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.
The divergence between Biden and Trump in China-U.S. relations lies primarily in Biden’s preference for traditional diplomacy and moderate rhetoric. He has prioritized maintaining open channels of communication with China, fostering closer coordination with allies and to some extent leveraging multilateral frameworks to mitigate tensions.
Under the Biden administration, the Chinese and U.S. presidents engaged in several substantive meetings, while diplomatic and security teams maintained consistent contact. Military-to-military dialogue was reinstated, and multiple working groups were established to address economic, financial and commercial issues.
Further, dialogues on artificial intelligence, climate change cooperation and anti-narcotics efforts were initiated. Through persistent efforts on China’s part, China-U.S. relations have achieved notable progress politically and fostered active cooperation in specific areas. The broader U.S. policy of economic, technological, security and cultural containment against China has not fundamentally softened compared with the Trump administration.
In light of this analysis and the backdrop of Trump’s recent election campaign, several conclusions can be drawn:
First, Trump laid the groundwork for the modern U.S. strategy of containment and suppression of China. The Biden administration has largely inherited and maintained these policies, reflecting a continuity that has spanned two administrations and is likely to persist into the next. Over time, this approach has become institutionalized, manifesting in doctrines such as the “small yard, high fence” strategy, as well as in legislative measures such as the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Security frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and AUKUS have been further entrenched during Biden’s tenure.
Given these developments, it is unlikely that the current trajectory of China-U.S. relations will experience any significant short- or medium-term reversals. The most notable differences between Trump and Biden (or between Trump and Kamala Harris during the recent election campaign) were primarily focused on domestic policy. On U.S.-China relations, their positions exhibited only superficial differences.
The China policies of the Trump and Biden administrations are expected to show “mutual succession,” though cloaked under distinct approaches and styles. Put simply, a second Trump administration will likely inherit and expand the China policies that Biden himself inherited and expanded from Trump’s first term. This degree of policy continuity is unprecedented in the history of China-U.S. relations.
Second, over the past eight years — four in office and four out — Trump has undergone a marked transformation from a political outsider to an experienced political operator. He has mastered the intricacies of Washington politics and become proficient at advancing both domestic and foreign policy.
During the first term, Trump’s effort to contain China unfolded in a state of relative disorder. However, a second Trump term will likely see a more systematic and orderly continuation of these policies. Yet, despite this newfound political acumen, Trump’s unpredictable and theatrical style will likely persist. His penchant for bold, unconventional maneuvers will remain a defining feature of his leadership. For instance, he might adopt more audacious crisis management tactics, take greater risks to advance his political priorities and pursue a no-holds-barred approach to political maneuvering.
Third, the return of Donald Trump to the presidency carries profound political significance. Whereas his initial election in 2016 was perceived as a personal triumph and a low-probability event, his second victory signaled a collective movement and was a high-probability event — at least in Trump’s rhetoric.
Eight years ago, Trump launched an anti-establishment political movement in the United States that has since gained substantial momentum, with the GOP being almost entirely defined by Trump’s leadership.
The contrast between Trump’s first term — which was characterized by a shortage of skilled personnel and frequent missteps — and his current systematic and swift assembly of a governing team is stark. A political figure like Trump, making a comeback through movements, would likely be both willing and capable of pursuing initiatives that conventional politicians might avoid. For example, during his first campaign, his proposal to impose tariffs on China was dismissed by many as a rhetorical flourish, and its implementation faced significant hurdles. In contrast, his current threats — such as imposing a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods or revoking China’s most favored nation status — must now be regarded as credible and actionable.
