Tensions in the South China Sea continue to boil. Mutual distrust is fueling a risky action-reaction dynamic. Both sides are trying to prevent the other from perceived attempts to alter the status quo. Sensing that it is not getting much support from ASEAN, including fellow claimant coastal states, Manila fell back on its U.S. alliance, expanded ties with Japan and other extra-regional partners as far as Europe. The country opened its territory, waters and airspace for access, drills, and patrols with U.S. and other partners. This inadvertently brings Chinese vessels and aircraft closer to their American rivals, raising the specter of accidents and demanding stronger crisis management mechanisms.
Maritime exercises and sails by the Philippines and its allies and partners in choppy waters are being met by similar Chinese drills. Notwithstanding efforts to de-escalate and prevent conflict, untoward sea and air encounters between Manila and Beijing become more frequent. Chinese ship presence in the Philippines’ western exclusive economic zone surged, intimidating local fishers and straining the capacity of Manila’s coastguard to respond. Chinese measures escalate from gray zone to actual use of force, moving from swarming and lasers to ramming and water cannons, all along weathering reputational costs. To compensate for its capacity shortfall and huge power disparity vis-à-vis its big neighbor disputant, Manila allowed an increased U.S. military footprint and allowed its longtime treaty ally to deploy a controversial mid-range missile system. These steps have yet to deter Chinese actions in the flashpoint. While China’s image as an intruder and bully plays into perceptions of the conflict, Philippine actions undoubtedly fuel questions about agency and proportionality as underwhelming diplomacy fails to halt deteriorating bilateral ties.
Clash of approaches: optics and realities
Experiencing a series of clashes raises the urgency of de-escalation. For the first time, three meetings under the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) were held in a year. The 9th BCM hosted by Manila in July and another meeting between the heads of the BCM from each side held in Beijing in September helped defuse crises in Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals, respectively. BCM was a vice-ministerial dialogue platform established in 2016. While BCM in the past Duterte government was moving towards exploring practical cooperation, including a possible joint offshore petroleum undertaking, BCM under the Marcos Jr. administration has been preoccupied with firefighting, dialing down tensions after heated clashes. While Beijing and Washington have been improving military dialogue and communications, the same cannot be said about Beijing and Manila. This dearth of security talks is risky. Manila was a no-show at the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium held in Qingdao last April. It also snubbed Beijing’s Xiangshan Forum last September. In contrast, the U.S., Japan, and ASEAN countries, among others, were present at these gatherings. It remains to be seen whether a joint coastguard committee would be restored. A proposal for direct hotlines between the foreign ministries and presidential offices of both sides was also pitched, but with no action to follow up. The 10th BCM was convened last January 16 in Xiamen and both sides agreed to keep the provisional arrangement reached over Ayungin Shoal last July.
Regrettably, domestic politics is complicating diplomacy. This is especially so as the past and incumbent presidents quarrel. Past deals with China entered by the previous Duterte government, including a so-called “gentleman’s agreement” to keep the status quo in the flashpoint, were vilified for allegedly jeopardizing the country’s position. Duterte was criticized for allegedly downplaying a 2016 arbitration award favorable to Manila in return for economic concessions. The current Marcos administration is projecting that it is better at securing the country’s interests in the ongoing conflict.
To his credit, Duterte got Filipino fishermen renewed access to the Scarborough Shoal, upgraded infrastructure in the Spratlys, invested in modernizing the country’s military and coast guard and raised the arbitral award in two UN General Assembly sessions without needlessly antagonizing China. At present, Marcos, while getting much praise, is in a tight spot. China intensified its presence in the Philippines’ western EEZ, interfered with resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, and challenged patrols in Scarborough Shoal. China’s “monster” coast guard ship (CCG 5901) faced off with PCG’s largest vessel, BRP Teresa Magbanua, in Sabina, and the latter was forced to leave the contested feature after being rammed by a CCG ship. Yet, for all the noise and posturing, the current Marcos administration also sought de-escalation.
Noise and posturing, but talking
A provisional arrangement for Philippine troop rotation and resupply (RORE) mission to Second Thomas Shoal reached with China last July. So far, it seems to be holding. Cases of disruption in RORE sorties to the low tide elevation were not heard since the deal was made. Manila may want to have a similar arrangement in other hotspots like Sabina (Escoda) and Scarborough Shoals. In Sabina, the Philippines may want a guarantee that China will not build structures or control the feature similar to what it did in Scarborough after a tense standoff in 2012. Sabina lies between Palawan and Second Thomas, and a rival claimant that controls it can interdict resupply efforts to Filipino marines stationed in BRP Sierra Madre in Second Thomas. Chinese control of Sabina is unacceptable to Manila as this feature is very close to Palawan, the country’s main western island facing the South China Sea. Manila worries that the dumping of dead or damaged corals in Sabina, which was reported last May, portends possible Chinese interest in occupying the low-lying feature. The Philippines may want China to accept the constant presence of its PCG vessel in Sabina with the understanding that Manila will not ground a ship similar to what it did in Second Thomas in 1999 or build a permanent structure in the shoal. China has not built any structure in Scarborough despite having a near-constant presence in the feature since 2012.
In Scarborough Shoal, Manila wants its local fishermen to have unfettered access inside the lagoon, where there are more fish. It may be open to discussing possible joint fisheries management with China, including an agreement on closed fishing season, catch limits, and marine species prohibited from being captured. The 2016 arbitration ruling acknowledged that the shoal is a traditional fishing ground for Filipino, Chinese and Vietnamese fishers. Duterte, in 2016, considered declaring it a marine sanctuary. Manila may also want to resume or keep its government presence in Scarborough through sea and air patrols. It may also want to keep delivering provisions, such as food and fuel, to its fishermen operating in the area.
The maritime row has become a topic of concern for media in the Philippines. It has higher issue salience compared to other coastal states like Indonesia, Malaysia, or Brunei. Unlike China or Vietnam, the Philippine government does not have control over its mass media as the more popular outlets are privately owned. The domestic media is expected to keep a watchful eye on choppy waters and expose inaction or lapses by the government in defending Philippine interests in its waters. However, demands for transparency to ensure that the country’s interests are not being compromised have to be tamed, as most diplomatic negotiations are done discreetly outside the public limelight. Thus, trust in the leadership that will deal with Beijing is important.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of Philippines-China diplomatic ties. It will be a pity to make the maritime row the centerpiece of that milestone. This goes against the interests and aspirations of their peoples and economies. In this Year of the Wooden Snake, the two neighbors should crawl out of the dangerous pit and avoid slithering into conflict. Better diplomacy and statesmanship should rise.
*This piece draws from the author’s prior work published in Italian text: Pitlo, Lucio III B. “Manila Morirebbe Per Gli Scogli Ma Non Per Taiwan.” Limes (Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica) No. 10 (November 2024). 223-231.
