The Trump administration's clash with Ukraine has raised doubts about America's strategic reliability, prompting concerns among European and Asian allies about a potential shift in global order under a second Trump presidency.
U.S. officials at the table of U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia, February 18, 2025.
The Trump administration’s public showdown with Ukraine sent shockwaves across the world. With both U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice-President J.D Vance openly berating their Ukrainian guest and wartime ally, President Volodymyr Zelensky, allies in Europe and beyond are beginning to question America’s strategic reliability like never before.
Europeans were unsurprisingly apoplectic. They were already deeply troubled by top American officials’ statements throughout the opening days of the second Trump administration. During his keynote speech at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), Vice-President JD Vance directly criticized both Europe’s domestic ‘woke’ politics as well as foreign policy, namely their supposed lack of requisite defense spending. This coincided with the U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s explosive remarks during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), where he effectively forward-deployed major concessions to Russia as part of any potential peace deal. The newly installed U.S. defense chief categorically rejected NATO membership for Ukraine as well as any U.S. troop deployment for future peacekeeping missions in the area.
Then came the shocking U.S.-Russia high-level meeting in Saudi Arabia, which excluded Ukraine, followed by Trump’s public criticism of his Ukrainian counterpart as a ‘dictator’ lacking democratic mandate. Days later, Zelenskyy’s public push for clear U.S. ‘security guarantees’ ended up with a shouting match in the Oval Office with top U.S. leaders, who quickly decided to cut off aid and intelligence-sharing with Kyiv as a punitive measure. In response, European leaders along Canada and Turkey quickly organized a special summit to discuss ways to bolster military support to Ukraine as well as their own joint capabilities against Russia.
The diplomatic fallout, however, went beyond the transatlantic ties. Japan’s leadership quickly pushed back against any criticism of their defense spending as well as reliability. It’s quite telling that even the Philippines – a former American colony and Washington’s oldest treaty ally in the region – began to sound the alarm bells, with the Philippine Ambassador to Washington Jose Romualdez warning his country to “be ready” for any scenario, including potential shocks to the century-old alliance. A top Filipino general, who oversees large-scale joint military exercises with the U.S., also reiterated that the U.S. is “not the only player in the region” – and that his country will ultimately have to rely on itself to protect its core interests.
Mixed Signals
Ahead of last year’s elections, America’s key allies were deeply divided about how disruptive a second Trump administration could turn out to be. Europeans were naturally worried about Trump’s lack of values-based commitment to Europe in stark contrast to the outgoing Biden administration, which proved singularly focused on shoring up both Ukraine and European defense in face of Russian aggression. Asian allies, however, were more nonchalant, if not fully complacent. Some frontline states such as the Philippines even welcomed a potentially more hawkish American administration.
The appointment of more traditionally-minded Republicans ,such as Senator Marco Rubio (to Secretary of State position) and long-time Republican strategists such as Elbridge Colby (to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy position), raised hopes that the second Trump administration would end up in a more “prioritizer” mode than a fully isolationist one.
Both Rubio and Colby have emphasized the need for focusing on Asia and, accordingly, lightening America’s strategic burden in Europe and the Middle East. Fresh into office, Secretary of State Rubio also sent the right signal to Asian allies by exempting Taiwan and the Philippines from ongoing suspension of United States Agency for International Development (USAUD) programs. In particular, $870 million for programs in Taiwan and $336 million for the Philippine military were part of the exemption. If anything, Manila was reassured of its “first-in-line” status by the expected implementation of a $5.3 billion bipartisan defense aid package aimed at accelerating the modernization of Amerced Forces of the Philippines.
The shocking Trump-Zelenskyy episode, however, not only rankled Europeans, but also frontline Asian allies. Philippine Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez warned that his country will “have to all be ready for that type of situation,” referring to America’s abrupt end of support to Ukraine. “It may be some other president in the future. But at the end of the day, each country now has to be ready to be able to beef up its defence, beef up its economic security,” he told the media.
From South Korea to Poland, key U.S. allies are openly discussing potential acquisition of nuclear weapons for deterrence and self-defense. There is growing recognition among all U.S. allies that beyond tactical and temperamental unpredictability, the second Trump administration could actually usher in a more seismic shift in the international order.
A Global Strategic Reboot
Optimist supporters often highlight that Trump is engaging in a rational strategic retrenchment through more effective burden-sharing with European allies, if not pursuing a ‘Reverse Nixon’ strategy of courting Russia away from China in favor of a new global strategic re-alignment altogether. With the Russian President offering to broke a new nuclear deal between Washington and Tehran and a rapprochement with multiple revisionist powers in the cards, some observers even envision a grand Trumpian strategy that could fully isolate China altogether. But many experts remain skeptical about this scenario, given the depth of Russian, Iranian and Chinese distrust towards America as well as the relative robustness of strategic ties among the three Eurasian powers.
Moreover, the Trump administration doesn’t have a Kissingerian figure, let alone a sophisticated and disciplined president, to pull off such a sensitive and complex strategic policy. What could be more likely is a global strategic re-ordering, whereby the world’s major powers establish new strategic condominiums with a degree of mutual respect for each other’s spheres of influence. This scenario seems plausible given the growing ideological alignment between “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans, on one hand, and anti-liberal nationalist leaders in places such as Russia as well as China.
Critics such as Fareed Zakaria have likened Trump’s potential global re-ordering vision to the formation of the trilateral “Holy Alliance” among conservative monarchs of Prussia, Russia and Austro-Hungary in the early-19th century. Moreover, Trump’s deep admiration for brazenly expansionist predecessors, from Andrew Jackson in the early-19th century to William McKinley in the early-20th century, may explain his public obsession with re-establishing American hegemony in the western hemisphere.
Ultimately, a transactionalist Trump may aim for a grand bargain not only with Russia, but also with the world’s second largest economy. Lest we forget, Trump has repeatedly equivocated on defending Taiwan in an event of conflict with China, while top Pentagon officials such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Byers have openly advocated for withdrawal of U.S. troops and weapons from Philippines in exchange for de-escalation of tensions in the South China Sea.
Accordingly, there are growing conversations about a potential “Mar-A-Lago Accord” deal with China, which is in a strong position to offer major economic concessions in exchange for partial American strategic withdrawal from Beijing’s supposed backyard. Thus, it would be foolhardy for even supposedly ‘first-in-line’ allies to presume full American reliability under a second Trump administration.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance warns of the “enemy within" when addressing the Munich Security Conference on 14 February, 2025.
What’s even clearer is the direction of Trump’s polarizing politics at home. Time and again, top government officials have warned of the “enemy within,” likely referring to Democrats and progressive forces resisting the second Trump policy agenda. At conflict with allies abroad, and at war with various forces and institutions at home, the second Trump presidency may end up undercutting American global leadership in an increasingly multipolar world, where rising powers and U.S. allies alike are similarly seeking greater influence and strategic autonomy.
