Policies outlive presidents’ terms because they are in America’s own interests. Trump’s personal style has proved to work well in appealing to voters he needed to get him elected this year. But it will not work that well in appealing to the world when he is in the White House. We must hope that he works to grasp the subtleties of international relations more quickly than his spontaneous style suggests is likely.

State Department says that the U.S. remains firmly committed to the “one China” policy, and that’s based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act and there’s been no change in U.S.'s longstanding policy with regard to Taiwan.

Without a question, it is still too early to predict the exact trajectory of Trump’s actual policy in office, given his penchant for policy equivocation and tendency for self-contradiction. Deals like the TTP now hang up in the air. There are also opportunities for China in the new administration. Doubts over Trump’s temperament, judgment, experience, and commitment to the global order could encourage a growing number of Asian nations to reconsider their relations with Washington in favor of Beijing. The Trump administration faces an uphill battle to reassure allies in the region that America will continue to preserve and provide public international goods in the region, stand strong with its allies, and deepen its economic engagement with Asia.

The following are remarks by Madam Fu Ying, chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress, at the inaugural China-U.S. Forum at

While the president-elect’s rhetoric suggests an isolationist turn, the reshaping of the US political landscape and Trump’s pragmatic, businesslike approach to decision-making suggest that his policies still defy easy prediction. Demanding that subordinates be highly loyal and obedient, he can be unscrupulous in order to achieve his goals, but at the same time does not lack flexibility in tactics.

Donald Trump’s unabashed pandering to an aggrieved white voter base as well as the long-standing consistency of his (much less-noticed) anti-trade convictions bear implications for Washington’s China policy. As the disillusioned, blue-collar nativist element within slowly defects from a party that remains bound and determined to cater to the interests of its 1% backers, including under the incoming Trump Administration, U.S. politics will enter a period of flux.

While the president-elect’s background might suggest a more commercial approach to world affairs, he is likely to preserve the US’ unchallengeable military advantages and strategic dominance – including some form of the “pivot to Asia”.

The US has shown no desire to defend the arbitration award with force as hinted by the exercise in the Philippine Sea. Although the American strategic community now sees markedly greater risks of military conflict with China, US decision-makers also don’t believe that the US has the ability to change or stop China’s international conduct by force.

Trump is not ideologically driven and is less biased against China than Clinton, with business ties booming with Chinese partners. Without such ties, US domestic statistics suggest, the US economy would shrink by one-third and prices would go up by one-third — undermining US status as the heart of global financial system. This is a price that the US could ill-afford, and Trump is pretty strong on math.

The relationship between the two countries is between two societies, not merely between governments or leaders, and that broad spectrum gives it long-term viability. Elevating our shared strategic gaze to the global level will be difficult, but it is essential.