The inclusion of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as new BRICS partner countries prompts an examination of how ASEAN’s growing representation in the bloc aligns with its longstanding principles of neutrality, inclusivity, and pragmatic engagement with global partners. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is known for its interest and openness to initiatives or groupings that bring benefits to the region. Major-to-middle powers and various organizations come to court ASEAN bearing diplomatic, economic, and security goods. BRICS will add to that mix.
Economics first, geopolitics follow
BRICS has steadily been adding emerging and developing economies to its roster. It is positioning itself as a platform to advocate for reforms in global governance, especially in the fields of economy and finance. This appeals to countries in the Global South who felt that such calls long went unheeded. BRICS frames itself as an economic platform, but its geopolitical factor is evident. The big role and influence of China and Russia and their frayed ties with the West make it impossible not to consider BRICS from a geopolitical angle. The entry of new partners Belarus, Bolivia and Cuba – countries that have traditionally fraught ties with Europe and US – may also reinforce the notion that BRICS is becoming an anti-West bulwark. This impression may be holding back some interested parties like Saudi Arabia from joining. But unlike G7, BRICS is non-ideological and dynamic. From the world’s largest democracy, India, to single-party dominated polity like China, the diversity of the political and governance systems of BRICS members dispel notions that it is but a club of authoritarian states.
The fast expansion of BRICS membership contrasts with the sluggish pace of the West-led G7. The latter had its roots in 1973 as the G5. It became G6 in 1975 and G7 the year after. In 1998, it became the G8 but reverted back to G7 in 2014. Various ideas were proposed to increase its roster, such as the D-10 in 2014 to include Australia and South Korea. However, these proposed configurations were not adopted. Looking at its history, it took 22 years for G7 to induct a new member, which it eventually booted out.
In contrast, BRIC began in 2009 and became BRICS the following year. This year, four members were added. At the Kazan Summit last October, 13 countries were designated as partners, four of whom came from ASEAN. Hence, BRICS grew from 5 to 9 in 14 years, half the time for G7 to add one recruit. Opening a pathway for 13 candidates shows BRICS’ eagerness to grow. Compared to G7, which is seen as an elitist “old boys pact” that is too Euro-American centric (except for Japan), BRICS is more geographically dispersed, with a presence in all corners of the Global South. The new partner countries show that BRICS Plus is breaking more ground in Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. That said, there is also the challenge of building and keeping consensus now that more heads are in.
Aside from membership and geographic expansion, BRICS have also made major strides, growing in a number of cooperation areas. From setting up its own bank (New Development Bank in 2015) to discussing an alternative payment system (BRICS Pay) and grain exchange, the group shows vitality and boldness. BRICS will continue to push for reforms in global governance but will not wait without doing something. Whether the institutions or mechanisms they are creating will compete, complement, or supplant existing ones depends on the pace of reforms in fundamental global institutions.
Finding confluence amid shifting sands
Goods that BRICS Plus can offer resonate with Southeast Asian countries. ASEAN is always on the pursuit of formations and groups that can deliver gains, whether in terms of market access, investments, infrastructure, technology, rule-making, and platforms to make their voices heard on global issues like debt or currency exchange stability. Malaysia, one of the new 13 partner countries, will hold the rotating ASEAN Chairmanship next year. This can boost efforts at finding synergies between ASEAN and BRICS.
Like BRICS, ASEAN is also a diverse group of ten members with varying levels of development and different economic and political set-ups. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are fast-growing economies. The first three are among the founders of ASEAN. All four are members of other economic clusters like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). All four ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement. Malaysia and Vietnam are also part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). All four are provisional founding members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) for Belt and Road Cooperation with Beijing. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and AIIB were announced in a visit by President Xi Jinping to Jakarta in 2013.
ASEAN members’ interest in BRICS is also driven by the need to hedge in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical and geo-economic landscape and the rise of a more multipolar world order. Concern about the weaponization of financial interdependence or currency leadership when relations with the West go south is another impetus. There is also disappointment over the failure to solve the crisis in the Middle East. For Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, Palestine remains a strong issue. Preventing the perpetuation of conflict and peaceful resolution of disputes is a shared desire.
In sum, BRICS’ expansion into Southeast Asia does not necessarily alter ASEAN’s geopolitical compass. Neither will it result in fracturing one of the world’s most successful and enduring regional organizations. One upside in the continuing growth of BRICS is that it can dilute the image that it is steered by one or two countries. The presence of ASEAN members in BRICS will enrich the bloc and ensure that Southeast Asian views will figure on BRICS’ agenda.
