China’s alleged militarization of the South China Sea isn’t supported by the facts, and the US definition of ‘militarization’ defies both common sense and international practice.

To solve the misperceptions the Philippines and China have toward the other’s intentions in the South China Sea, both sides should be more open to understanding the rationale of each other’s actions and behavior, commit to non-militarization of the disputed areas while refraining from using confrontational rhetoric, and not force each other’s red lines in public so as to avoid either party from losing face.

On August 10-11, Philippine Former President and Special Envoy Fidel V. Ramos met in Hong Kong with his old friends －Madam Fu Ying and Professor Wu Shicun in a friendly atmosphere. They discussed, in their private capacity, the way forward in the spirit of universal brotherhood and sisterhood for peace and cooperation between the two countries.

The once anticipated expansive maritime entitlements of numerous small maritime features have now been determined to possess nothing greater than a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Now, all of the claimants in the South China Sea should be able to step back and reassess how they view the region both diplomatically and peacefully.

The award in the Philippines v China case opens a chapter of a much broader and long-term relations between the states. While addressing some legal issues, it can not resolve all other conflicts, differences and competing interests. Rather, the conflicts are best handled between the two states through friendly consultations and negotiations under the prevailing Asian culture and core values of a non-confrontational approach, compromising sentiments, and a mutually understanding mind-set.

An EEZ claimed from the Spratly Islands as a unit could re-invigorate tensions between the two super-powers on the legality of military activities in the EEZ. China should carefully consider the long-term ramifications of a straight baseline declaration, not only in terms of its legality but also in terms of the impact it could have on an already volatile situation.

No country is willing to accept an international judicial judgment or arbitration award against its unwillingness, especially when such judgment is related to a major political issue that concerns the state. Thus, China is correct in its decision of non-acceptance in allowing a third party mechanism to determine a territorial dispute and maritime delimitation.

Tsai Ing-wen should give up unrealistic expectations on the US-Japan “values alliance”, and reconsider Taiwan’s role in the South China Sea issue. It’s not too late for her to look at the history of the Chinese nation and link up that history with Taiwan’s future and corresponding rights to Taiping Island.

China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea and adjacent waters is a reasonable, legitimate historical fact that can’t be denied by any party, any means. It is utterly groundless to accuse China of violating international law, and the US-inspired tribunal merely increases tension to no purpose.

Though The Hague ruling pertains to the Philippines-China dispute, it will bolster similar claims by other states against China’s nine-dash line; it will increase pressure on China to seek a negotiated resolution to the overlapping claims; and it will circumscribe China’s SCS claims. In response, China must assure the ASEAN states of its benign intentions, dispelling impressions of hegemonic intentions.