China and the United States have yet to reach consensus in response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is not prepared to follow China’s path toward a rapid resurrection of the Six-Party Talks, while Beijing resists imposing alternative U.S. policies of applying unilateral sanctions on North Korea’s foreign enablers or reinforcing military pressure on Pyongyang.

Pyongyang’s recent missile tests show that becoming a nuclear power is not merely a bargaining chip but a genuine threat. The next US president will take renewed stock of the situation in the DPRK in 2017, and Beijing should start doing that right now. Protecting its own homeland security should and must be the fundamental gauge for China’s policy towards the DPRK.

While the world’s attention has been focused on North Korea’s recent nuclear test and satellite launch, important developments regarding the nuclear issue were also taking place in South Korea. Recent developments suggest that the patience of the South Korean people and some members of the political elite is wearing thin.

China and the U.S. agree on the need to impose sanctions, but not on the process and purpose. The starting point for imposing new sanctions should be to promote denuclearization and safeguard peace, not to escalate the tensions and not to cause chaos on the Korean peninsula.

Fundamentally, Chinese leaders seek to change Iran’s behavior, but not its regime. PRC policy makers want Iranian oil, but they are cautious about irritating more important commercial partners, especially the United States; when defending Tehran, Beijing strives to avoid confronting Washington directly.

There are voices inside China as well as the US that urge Beijing to punish North Korea’s “bad behavior” more harshly. But China and the US interpret the very end and means of the situation differently, In China’s mind, the situation is more a US responsibility rather than China’s, and use of coercion as the dominant tool has been proved ineffective.

PRC policy makers have found themselves cross-pressured: They would prefer that Pyongyang refrain from provocative actions like nuclear weapons testing, yet are unwilling to impose the substantial pressure on the DPRK desired by the United State for fear that its regime would collapse and China would suffer economic and security costs.

The lesson of the DPRK’s latest nuclear test is that talking to North Korea offers a better hope of success than ignoring it. But then, that’s what Beijing has been telling the U.S. for a long time.

George Koo describes how a treaty between the U.S. and North Korea was within grasp until George W. Bush’s administration halted the proceedings. Since then, dealing with Pyongyang has become a blame game between the U.S. and China.

Washington should propose a “grand bargain” to Pyongyang by formally ending the state of war on the Korean Peninsula, lifting of all except narrowly defined military sanctions against the North, and U.S. diplomatic recognition of the North Korean regime. In exchange, Pyongyang would agree to place its nuclear program under international safeguards and extend diplomatic recognition to South Korea.