An anti-development drive by the United States aims to undercut China in the Solomon Islands and elsewhere. Washington portrays China as a bad actor, sows discord and sets up exclusive trading blocs in a geopolitical tsunami designed to maintain U.S. dominance.

Three primary U.S. goals have their limitations. While it currently enjoys an internal bipartisan consensus on China, diplomatic and security problems, loopholes and contradictions exist for many countries in the region. The U.S. seeks to adjust the system to its advantage.

IPEF negotiations are underway and four joining statements were recently released at the first in-person IPEF ministerial meeting. But Washington’s motives and the direction they lead negotiations remains to be seen, as they seek to build allyship in the Pacific and increase competition with China.

NATO’s global hegemony has gone unchallenged since the fall of the USSR decades ago. Now, with China’s rise to global prominence and arguably the second most powerful nation in the world, can NATO avoid another Cold War-style showdown on the global stage?

A significant step in the Biden administration’s effort to realign NATO is the attempt to link the Atlantic and Pacific strategies. The U.S. is doing this in part by amplifying the so-called China threat in the Asia-Pacific and exporting the NATO concept of alliances against big powers.

Pacific Island countries can benefit from both China and the United States, so their best choice is to cooperate with both. The new alignment will not disturb friendly relations between China and the islands.

Is the U.S. ready to meaningfully engage with the Asia-Pacific region? Their latest offering comes in the form of the IPEF, and the differences between the U.S.-led trade pact and competing ones led by Asian powers will show whether American leadership has brought enough to the table.

The IPEF - a U.S.-initiated trade and development partnership - is poised to bring in enthusiastic participation from several nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Notably, Southeast Asian states are well represented among members, giving the U.S. considerable influence right in China’s backyard.

Competition with the United States has become a catalyst for change in the way China deals with countries in its own neighborhood. A sophisticated approach in Asia will be required as China balances all its interactions.

Six factors suggest that the IPEF will not succeed: meager benefits for developing economies, new and unpopular commitments, disproportionate benefits for the U.S., vague negotiating plans, uncertainty of the framework’s survival under a new American administration and skepticism by U.S. allies.