This week, China's homegrown tech giants Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu took the competition to the U.S., showcasing the best of their innovation at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas.

The key to which country currently takes the lead in the global tussle in AI and other technological forefronts can be boiled down to some fundamentals, while China is pushing the boundaries in this Sputnik Moment, it still lags behind the U.S. in this global tussle.

Cybersecurity has been a complicated and thorny issue in China-US relations ever since the Obama administration. How will China and the US manage cyberspace under Trump Era?

China’s digital economy is a force to be reckoned with. The country now accounts for 42% of global e-commerce, boasts one-third of the world’s most successful tech startups, and conducts 11 times more mobile payments than the United States per year. But there are major challenges ahead.

Since China joined the internet in 1994, China-US cyber relations have gone through three stages. What might the fourth stage look like?

The question for Western diplomats dealing in global Internet governance must be how to effectively engage China so as to maintain peace, security and stability in cyberspace – goals to which China’s cooperation strategy commits explicitly. Will cold-shouldering China empower those voices in Beijing advocating a more hawkish and isolating approach to global internet norms? Meeting China halfway on some of its desiderata, for instance a more high-profile presence at flagship Chinese events, might not only lead to a broader basis for engagement and trust, but also enable support for those voices within the Chinese system whose objectives overlap more with that of outside countries.

Despite Donald Trump’s potentially passive attitude toward international governance and international cooperation, China and the US need collaboration in cyberspace. The threats and potential risks in cyberspace brook no footdragging, they are clear and present dangers. China-US cooperation in cyberspace not only helps all of humanity share Internet dividends, but it is also in both countries’ fundamental interest.

: Franz-Stefan Gady argues that the end goal of Sino-U.S. deliberations will not be an end to state-sponsored hacking or cyber espionage, but to put a framework in place that will not only help prevent disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other parts of the bilateral relationship, but also help both sides to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes strategic stability, i.e., peace, in cyberspace.

Sino-U.S. relations in cyberspace in 2016 will be defined by three key policies: attribution, sanctions, and norms. Franz-Stefan Gady discusses what each policy could look like, and also the reviews the cyber diplomacy between the two countries in 2015.

China’s position on Internet governance is that the Internet is a mere reflection of physical space, and therefore should be subject to similar norms of non-external interference. After the Wuzhen Conference, the question on how to engage with China in the realm of cyberspace remains largely unanswered.