Fan Jishe, Professor, the Central Party School of Communist Party of China
Mar 14, 2016
Pyongyang should pay a price for its violation of Security Council resolutions, but punishment by itself will not magically solve the nuclear problem. If sanctions could not be translated into a strategic rethink, they will only add more pain to the ordinary North Koreans' already miserable life.
Shen Dingli, Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
Mar 14, 2016
High-level talks between China and the US have served to stabilize bilateral ties, making agreement possible on tougher sanctions against the DPRK and setting the stage for an imminent summit meeting between the two countries’ leaders.
Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University
Mar 07, 2016
This US defense installation would offer no real protection from the North’s usable weaponry, and would surely provoke the DPRK into a new, vicious cycle of action vs. reaction. The idea has already stirred strong protests from the Chinese and Russian governments, which believe THAAD, if deployed, will threaten their security interests. The idea of deploying THAAD on Korean soil is a bad example of how anger and angst can overpower and replace rational response.
Chen Xiangyang, Director and Research Professor, CICIR
Feb 25, 2016
Beijing should take effective measures to contain DPRK moves to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. China should also urge and assist the DPRK to reform, open up and pursue peaceful development, which is the right way of economic development and improvement of people’s livelihood.
Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Feb 25, 2016
China and the United States have yet to reach consensus in response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is not prepared to follow China’s path toward a rapid resurrection of the Six-Party Talks, while Beijing resists imposing alternative U.S. policies of applying unilateral sanctions on North Korea’s foreign enablers or reinforcing military pressure on Pyongyang.
Xiao An, Researcher, Pangoal Institution
Feb 24, 2016
Pyongyang’s recent missile tests show that becoming a nuclear power is not merely a bargaining chip but a genuine threat. The next US president will take renewed stock of the situation in the DPRK in 2017, and Beijing should start doing that right now. Protecting its own homeland security should and must be the fundamental gauge for China’s policy towards the DPRK.
Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow, Randolph Bourne Institute
Feb 23, 2016
While the world’s attention has been focused on North Korea’s recent nuclear test and satellite launch, important developments regarding the nuclear issue were also taking place in South Korea. Recent developments suggest that the patience of the South Korean people and some members of the political elite is wearing thin.
Yang Wenjing, Research Professor, Institute of American Studies, CICIR
Feb 02, 2016
There are voices inside China as well as the US that urge Beijing to punish North Korea’s “bad behavior” more harshly. But China and the US interpret the very end and means of the situation differently, In China’s mind, the situation is more a US responsibility rather than China’s, and use of coercion as the dominant tool has been proved ineffective.
Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Feb 02, 2016
PRC policy makers have found themselves cross-pressured: They would prefer that Pyongyang refrain from provocative actions like nuclear weapons testing, yet are unwilling to impose the substantial pressure on the DPRK desired by the United State for fear that its regime would collapse and China would suffer economic and security costs.
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
Jan 21, 2016
The lesson of the DPRK’s latest nuclear test is that talking to North Korea offers a better hope of success than ignoring it. But then, that’s what Beijing has been telling the U.S. for a long time.