Bordered by a strong yet not very friendly Russia, these countries are bearing the blows from forces against globalization. While it might be a good choice for them to cooperate with the United States to build a new political and economic bloc, it’s not clear if there is room for the United States and Russia to compete in both energy and geopolitics here.

Europe is a long way from a common defense structure, but the need is growing. And, ironically, the unpopular Trump may prove more of a help than a hindrance.

Put simply, President Trump thinks that Europe and other allies have profited too much at the US’ expense and that the US should stop being such a sucker. That view will shape trans-Atlantic relations for the duration of this presidency.

The new rapprochement between Brussels and Beijing involves converging economic interests between Europe and China – and diverging strategic interests between Europe and America. While the shift was conceptualized as a reaction to a policy vacuum created by Trump, in reality, the ties between Brussels and Beijing have grown steadily since the 1990s, even when U.S.-Chinese ties have fallen under pressure.

It is not ideology that Beijing should count on, then, but incompetence. With TPP and the Paris Agreement, the Trump White House has been driven by rank opportunism – not in pursuit of a coherent set of policy goals, but rather to claim alpha status by the simplest means available.

As cooperation advances and with a shared position on climate change, China-EU relations are likely to maintain a momentum of steady growth, and cooperation will become increasingly important in this world of increased uncertainties about the US.

As cooperation advances and with a shared position on climate change, China-EU relations are likely to maintain a momentum of steady growth, and cooperation will become increasingly important in this world of increased uncertainties about the US.

When the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other U.S. allies decided to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 amidst clear opposition from Washington, some questioned whether it meant the transatlantic relationship was weakening in the face of a rising China. In terms of risk, rebalancing, and reward, however, the AIIB was not a situation that pitted Europe’s relationship with the U.S. against its relationship with China. Such a case may offer insight when considering the Paris Agreement and Europe’s actions if faced with choices between Washington and Beijing.

While the new French leader will focus an enormous amount of resources on domestic reform, he will also try to accomplish something big in foreign affairs. As a pro-EU president of France, Macron will make the restart of the Franco-German engine his primary task.