After his first year in office, Rodrigo Duterte has arrived at three key realizations: first, it has become increasingly clear he doesn’t have the power to unilaterally shape his country’s defense policy; second is how far he can distance the Philippines from the U.S.; and third, expanding cooperation between the Philippine military and the Pentagon will constrain Duterte’s outreach to China.

The first meeting of the biannual bilateral consultation mechanism to manage the South China Sea disputes, which is hoped to have a positive cascading effect on the early conclusion for a regional Code of Conduct on the disputed sea. Hints of possible cooperation in non-traditional security can be gleaned from President Duterte’s interest to welcome Chinese presence in the Sulu Sea to help address maritime piracy and armed sea robbery.

Strong political will from both sides, coupled with quiet diplomacy to handle contentious issues and consider each other’s concerns, and is leading to flexibility in China-Philippines management of their maritime disputes.

That Beijing and Manila have smoothly maneuvered a new bilateral consultation mechanism for the South China Sea issue in such a short time — and made it a platform for confidence-building as well as maritime and security cooperation — is praiseworthy. It also demonstrates the futility of outside interference in the sea issue.

During his second official visit to Beijing in less than a year, Duterte held formal talks with both Chinese President Xi Jinping as well as Premiere Li Keqiang, where the two neighbors reaffirmed their commitment to look beyond their difference in the South China Sea and, instead, focus on areas of common concern. In exchange for these diplomatic and strategic concessions, Duterte expects China to serve as a key partner for his country’s national development. China’s new Silk Road initiative, in particular, has caught the Philippines’ attention.

The Philippines is often portrayed as an American ally on the verge of defecting to Eastern powers, with Duterte firmly overseeing this strategic shift. Yet, a closer look reveals that the tough-talking Filipino leader doesn’t have the requisite power to unilaterally reshape his country’s foreign policy, nor is he interested in fully severing ties with the Philippines’ century-old ally, America.

Although many criticize Philippine President Duterte’s apparent flip-flopping and unpredictable foreign policy, a careful look will reveal several emerging consistencies in evolving Philippine diplomacy, notably expanding economic ties with China, downplaying security ties with U.S., and managing regional disputes. Furthermore, given evolving regional and global dynamics, President Duterte’s foreign policy ambiguity reflects regional state practice and may actually benefit the Philippines.

Could the arbitration award of 12 July 2016 have unexpectedly opened a cycle of appeasement between China and South-East Asian countries in the South China Sea? It is difficult to conclusively answer this question, since behind these changes are uncertainties and continuities likely to undermine at any moment the progress made.

Like the confidence-building measures that have maintained peace and stability along the disputed China-India border, a code of conduct agreement with ASEAN will smooth relations and invite new cooperation — without regard to the Philippines’ improper and unilateral appeal for outside arbitration.

As long-needed economic reforms are taking off in the Philippines, regime change plans have been prepared in the U.S. State Department against a democratically-elected president who enjoys very high popular support.