The Modi government must reflect on the political drivers that have incited China to construct a road of marginal military value against a charged political backdrop. Hard as it might appear on surface to comprehend, the standoff is only secondarily about territory; principally, it is about the politics of the bilateral relationship.

Since reform and opening up, Chinese academia has focused its research on China-US relations: In both economic and scientific fields, China is chasing after the US and India is chasing after China. We must not forget about those who are after us by setting our eyes only on those ahead.

The US-India relationship has been burdened by mutual misgivings as of late. In Washington summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump displayed a comfortable chemistry, with no real discord to be seen – a departure from some of Trump’s other early diplomatic forays.

Changing the goal from denuclearization to resuming talks is something worth trying, since other options are becoming dead ends or getting increasingly risky.

Bilateral ties between Myanmar and China, at least at top governing levels, appear to be improving following souring diplomatic and economic ties during the previous Thein Sein administration. As China expands its investment footprint, it must heed the widespread wariness, and in some areas, strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar.

It will take much more from the U.S. to sway China, such as promising to remove the anti-missile defenses from South Korea if North Korea gives up its nukes, and promising not to move U.S. troops north, among other such ‘gives.’ Instead, the impatient and impulsive Trump Administration seems ready to assume China will not cooperate and move on to dealing with North Korea some other way.

Despite the ruling of the South China Sea arbitration case, the Chinese continue to use the waters in Filipino territory however they please. The Duterte Administration downplayed the ruling in order to try and strengthen economic and strategic ties with China, and the Philippines are paying for it.

Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in a standoff in Doka La – where the borders of Bhutan, China and India meet – for almost a month now, the longest such impasse between the two armies since 1962. And India is far from the only country that has been humiliated at the hands of China.

For the past 12 months, the waters of the South China Sea have been fairly tranquil. However, long-time, and hence jaded, observers of one of Asia’s most intractable disputes understand the cyclical nature of tensions; and also know that given the unchanging central drivers of the conflict and the absence of collective political will to palliate those drivers and negotiate an equitable solution, periods of calm are invariably followed by strong tempests.

While Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics have dominated the news cycle since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, China’s activities in the South China Sea have drawn close lessons from the Kremlin’s playbook. Beijing’s embrace of the concept of modern hybrid warfare has been part of the regional power’s calculated bid to blur the lines between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ in pursuit of its maritime sovereignty claims and avoid outright provocation of its rivals – particularly the United States.