The early decades of the 21st Century have already seen a rapid shifting of global power, and today one could view the world’s relationships flowing through a four-way struggle for balance and dominance between the U.S., China, the EU, and Russia.

The effect on history of the last one — the Trump populist revolution — remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the Trump phenomenon, its support base and the logic of reform it represents, will not simply vanish.

The second Trump administration’s China policies have thus far been very opaque and difficult to discern. However, in recent weeks a variety of indicators are beginning to make them clearer—and one dominant theme emerges: China will be viewed as America’s principal adversary.

Trump’s actions in dealing with Russia and Ukraine and conflict in Gaza have been disruptive and unpredictable. With more holistic foreign policy statements still in the works, only speculation can tell us where Trump might head regarding the Indo-Pacific.

The more things change, the more they seem to stay the same.

The Trump administration's clash with Ukraine has raised doubts about America's strategic reliability, prompting concerns among European and Asian allies about a potential shift in global order under a second Trump presidency.

Trump’s Oval Office ambush of Ukrainian President Zelensky highlights the unpredictability and volatility of U.S. diplomacy under his second term—an unsettling prospect for China as it prepares for a potential Trump-Xi summit. With Trump emboldened and increasingly unpredictable, China may face new challenges in navigating an engagement with a leader who thrives on disruption.

The future for European countries hinges on maintaining competitiveness and growth while safeguarding the quality of life of their citizens. The shock delivered by Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could hasten Europe’s long-overdue strategic awakening.

The Asia-Pacific region began to exhibit signs of easing major geopolitical tensions in late 2024, but has started to heat up again following President Trump’s return to power in the White House. During the ‘easing’ period, although low-level disputes persisted in the vast region, in the South China Sea, and in cross-strait relations, the risk of a conflict involving regional heavyweights was not imminent.

If one takes Marco Rubio’s recent remarks on the end of unipolarity at face value, one could be mistaken for believing that the question of a multipolar world is settled. On the contrary, Rubio’s ruminations, together with remarks from members of the new Trump Administration, including the President himself, buttressed with decisions made in the first few weeks of the new administration, suggest that the issue of multipolarity is very much in question.