Not South Korea, Not Japan, Not the U.S.: China Must Steer Peace in the Asian Pacific

Chinese President Xi Jinping (C) speaks during the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Shanghai, east China, May 21, 2014. (Xinhua/Pang Xinglei)

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is front and center in global news as a flurry of concerning developments have broken in rapid succession. Late in July, the Kim regime successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that analysts believe may be capable of reaching New York. That same day, a confidential assessment by U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officials concluded that North Korea has finally produced a miniaturized warhead, often used for missile delivery, and possesses as many as sixty of these warheads. Both of these revelations break with the previous consensus among experts that North Korea was roughly a year away from achieving the miniaturization and missile technology that would allow for a strike on the American mainland.

Tensions reached a fever pitch on August 8th, when President Trump declared that further threats to the United States would be “met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” Hours later, the DPRK state news service KCNA revealed that a plan to strike the U.S. territory of Guam – home to 163,000 people and two American military bases – was under consideration. Under such circumstances, the only certainty is that the bilateral progress of de-escalation has broken down and that peace cannot be achieved through actions of these two states alone.

The international response to Kim’s sabre rattling has been swift and decisive. The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to approve sanctions that will cut North Korea’s export revenue by roughly a third. To its credit, Beijing has made assurances that it will honor the sanctions, which will also have deleterious effects on China due to the nearly exclusive trade relationship between the two nations. Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke on the matter, reiterating Chinese support for non-proliferation and regional stability.

Non-proliferation is undoubtedly a goal shared by Washington and Beijing, but the ideal picture of regional stability takes on very different guises between the two. The U.S. government has long viewed Pyongyang with mistrust; though the three-generation Kim dynasty has proven remarkably rational toward its self-preservation, it has also showed little restraint in the use of force. Washington sees North Korean nuclear capabilities not only as a threat to the citizens of America and its allies, but also as a means of preservation for an oppressive regime. China, however, views North Korea’s nuclear program as the logical and inevitable response to external threats from the United States and regional neighbors.

Beijing cannot possibly wish to see a nuclear capable North Korea – especially because that power would reduce China’s leverage over its significantly less substantial ally. Dartmouth’s Jennifer Lind points out that China’s leaders are no doubt worried about the troops who would flood across the demilitarized zone to take part in humanitarian and stabilization missions if reunification was achieved. Beijing would like to maintain the current buffer to the 38th Parallel, and won’t risk losing it. However, despite assertions that China cannot singlehandedly rein in North Korea, it will have to take the lead.

Crucially, it appears likely that missile components being used in North Korea have been procured from Chinese companies or through North Korean holding companies in China. Beijing has begun the crackdown on companies and individuals involved in these transactions, but a strictly enforced zero-tolerance policy would likely slow the growth of North Korea’s arsenal and win favor with U.N. partners. Ongoing diplomatic overtures are also vital to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

Complicating things are the shifting political landscapes in South Korea and Japan. In June, South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in broke with his predecessor Park Geun-hye and her Saenuri party by suspending the deployment of THAAD missile systems to defend against North Korean ICBMs. Following the events of July 28th, Moon doubled back in favor of the more pragmatic, defensive course of THAAD deployment.

Scandals in Japan led to the resignation of Defense Minister Inada Tomomi in July, and a subsequent reshuffle of Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet. While the restructuring represents a drop in Abe’s overall political capital, it replaced the novice Inada with Onodera Itsunori, a veteran defense minister who has spearheaded the movement to extend Japanese forces the right to make pre-emptive strikes on targets deemed threatening to national security. Onodera’s first week back on the job will not deter him from that goal, and may only increase the level of support among the public for Japanese unilateral action.

China’s place in this scenario, as North Korea’s sole ally, is unenviable to say the least. The push in South Korea and Japan to increase domestic readiness for North Korean attacks will discredit China as a sufficiently reliable protector for the Kim regime. Yale political scientists Alex Debs and Nuno Monteiro find in their 2016 book Nuclear Politics that unstable states seek nuclear arms when allies are perceived as too weak or unwilling to fend off threats. In order to bring Kim to the table, Beijing will need to convince him that regional threats from Japan and South Korea can be managed, and that the United States is willing to stand down.

In that regard, the Trump presidency is a mixed bag for China. For all his bluster, Trump has demonstrated himself to be devoid of concrete Asia policy: options that would have been inconceivable to a President Obama or a President Bush may now be on the table. For one, Beijing should no longer take for granted that the sitting president has a strong ideological investment in the execution or outcome of a hypothetical Korean reunification. It also seems plausible that a unified Korean Peninsula might be politically closer to China than to Japan or the United States, once the North Korean threat is removed.

Trump’s detachment from decades of U.S. security policy in East Asia dismays America’s diplomats and its allies, but it offers Chinese leaders a chance to voice their concerns. Beijing is right to claim that no one nation can solve the problem of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. As the sole country in good standing with all parties involved, however, China must exhaust all options toward that goal.